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An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged 
Place of Originalist Precedent 
Lee J. Strang 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Originalists1 over the past thirty years have constructed a 
coherent, elaborate, and powerful theory of constitutional 
interpretation.2 In doing so, originalism has changed to overcome 
cogent criticisms lodged against it.3 However, busied with building 
and defending originalism, originalists have thus far failed to fully 
explain the role of precedent in constitutional interpretation.4 
Recently, some originalists, including myself, have provided 
explanations of the role of nonoriginalist constitutional precedent.5 
 
  Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to Eric Claeys, Ken 
Kilbert, Lou Mulligan, Rob Natelson, Michael Rappaport, Doug Ray, Bill Richman, Lawrence 
Solum, Rebecca Zietlow, participants at the University of Toledo College of Law Workshop, 
participants at the 2009 Law and Society Annual Conference, participants at the 2010 Midwest 
Political Science Association Annual Conference, and participants at the Ohio Junior Scholars 
Workshop, for their comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank James Carty, Adi Pawar, 
and Katie Pawlak for their research assistance, the University of Toledo College of Law for its 
research support, and Elizabeth for her love and support.  
 1. By originalism, I mean the theory of constitutional interpretation which holds that 
the public meaning of the Constitution’s text, when it was ratified, is its authoritative meaning. 
Professor Larry Solum has argued that originalism is defined by two propositions: (1) the 
fixation thesis and (2) the contribution thesis. See Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and 
Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 411–12 (2009) (describing these 
theses); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism is Useless 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2010) (adopting this 
definition) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). My definition accords with Solum’s 
theses.  
 2. For a broad review of the history of originalism see DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 1–89 (2005); JOHNATHAN 
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
(2005).  
 3. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–100, 113–16 (2004) (explaining originalism’s evolution).  
 4. I will use the label “constitutional precedent” for precedents that purport to 
articulate the Constitution’s meaning and to apply that meaning to the facts presented by a 
case.  
 5. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, On Text and Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 961 
(2008); Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to 
Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent 
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In this Article, I take the important next step and describe the status 
and role of originalist precedent6 in constitutional adjudication.  
It is crucial for originalists to provide a theory of originalist 
precedent because, as prominent critics have argued,7 originalism—at 
least at first blush—appears to run afoul of the judiciary’s deeply held 
commitment to stare decisis. This tension arises, the critics argue, 
because, in each new case, originalists are compelled to look beyond 
precedent and freshly interpret the Constitution based solely upon its 
original meaning. To make matters worse, originalists have failed to 
address this powerful criticism. In this Article, I offer an originalist 
response to this problem. 
Originalism must provide an account of the roles originalist 
precedent plays in constitutional adjudication for three primary 
reasons. First, originalism, as currently articulated, has a gap—it is 
not a fully developed theory of constitutional interpretation—
because it has not yet addressed the status and role of originalist 
precedent. To offer a rich, robust theory of constitutional 
interpretation, originalists must tackle the thorny problem of 
originalist precedent.  
Second, precedent plays such a central role in our legal practice 
that all plausible interpretative methodologies must account for the 
role of precedent in their theories. Relatedly, if originalism does not 
have a role for originalist precedent, then it would dramatically 
diverge from our current legal practice and lack explanatory power. 
Along these lines, Professor Richard Fallon, a critic of originalism, 
 
with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); 
Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative 
Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 311, 327 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The 
Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); Stephen J. Markman, 
Resisting the Ratchet, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983 (2008); John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 803 (2009); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 289 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional 
Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future Of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
155, 159 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, 
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006).  
 6. An originalist precedent, as I will explain in Part III, is a precedent that meets the 
standard of Originalism in Good Faith. Originalism in Good Faith, in turn, provides that a 
precedent is an originalist precedent if it evinces an objectively good faith attempt to articulate 
and apply the Constitution’s original meaning.  
 7. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 43 (2001).  
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has suggested that “[a]ccording to the originalist . . . approach[], 
every case should furnish an occasion for judicial inquiry into the 
truth about what the Constitution means. Yet the Supreme Court 
patently does not function this way.”8  
Third, most scholars believe that stare decisis is normatively 
attractive,9 and its prominence in our legal practice suggests that its 
participants do as well;10 consequently, theories of constitutional 
interpretation will be more normatively attractive if they maintain a 
place for stare decisis. Originalism, as well, will be more normatively 
attractive if it provides a role for stare decisis.  
In this Article, I show that originalism does retain a robust role 
for originalist precedent, thereby enabling it to fit our legal practice 
and appropriate the normative attractiveness of stare decisis. I use the 
label “Interpretative and Constructive Approaches” to identify how 
judges should treat originalist precedent. In brief, the Interpretative 
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent take their 
names from the two functions of originalist precedent. First, some 
originalist precedent performs the epistemic role of providing 
evidence of how the Constitution’s original meaning governs a case. 
Second, other originalist precedent performs the metaphysical task of 
creating constitutional meaning. Judges will use the Interpretative or 
Constructive Approaches to originalist precedent depending on the 
precedent’s function, as described in Part V.  
A presumption protects the evidentiary and creative “work” 
performed by originalist precedent. This presumption gives 
originalist precedent its privileged place in constitutional 
adjudication. By following the Interpretative and Constructive 
Approaches toward originalist precedent, judges can rely on 
originalist precedent and avoid the extraordinary expenditure of 
resources that would be necessary to freshly evaluate every possible 
constitutional issue in cases that come before them. For example, in 
an Equal Protection Clause challenge to affirmative action, instead of 
deciding anew whether the Clause prohibits discrimination on the 
 
 8. Id. at 43; see also Barnett, Response, supra note 5, at 1232 (“In recent years, as the 
popularity of originalist interpretation has risen . . . its critics have increasingly harped on its 
supposed incompatibility with the doctrine of stare decisis.”).  
 9. See Solum, supra note 5, at 186–201 (defending a “Neoformalist” conception of 
stare decisis).  
 10. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 327 (stating that “the caselaw construing the 
[Constitution’s] text is . . . of critical importance”).  
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basis of race, courts can rely on originalist precedent for that 
proposition and move on to the novel issue raised by the case. The 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches embody this 
presumption.  
As importantly, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches 
resolve an ongoing quandary in originalism. On the one hand, 
originalism’s core tenet is that the Constitution’s original meaning is 
its authoritative meaning.11 On the other hand, Article III requires 
that federal judges give significant respect to constitutional 
precedent.12 How can a judge be faithful to the Constitution’s 
original meaning, while at the same time give significant respect to 
precedent? The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches to 
originalist precedent cut that Gordian Knot. They explain how 
originalist precedent is a faithful articulation and application of the 
original meaning and, therefore, in following originalist precedent, 
judges are faithful to both the original meaning and Article III’s 
command that they give precedent significant respect.  
This Article proceeds as follows. First, in Part II, I briefly review 
the debate in originalism over the role of constitutional precedent. I 
explain that originalists have thus far failed to describe originalist 
precedent’s place in a fully explicated originalism.  
Second, in Part III, I describe how participants in our legal 
practice can distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist 
precedent using a standard called Originalism in Good Faith 
(“OGF”). Under OGF, precedents that are objectively good faith 
attempts to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning, 
are originalist precedents.  
Third, in Part IV, I revisit the original meaning of “judicial 
Power” in Article III, which requires federal judges to give 
significant respect to constitutional precedent. With this background 
in mind, I show that the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches 
meet Article III’s mandate. In doing so, they remain faithful to the 
Constitution’s original meaning, as I explain in Part V.  
 
 11. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Public Law Research Paper No. 
07-24, 2008), availale at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 
(“[T]he fixation thesis is the claim that semantic content of the Constitution . . . is fixed at the 
time of adoption.”); see also id. at 6–8 (describing the “contribution thesis,” which states that 
the Constitution’s original meaning contributes to constitutional law).  
 12.  Strang, supra note 5, at 447–62; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 
823–25 (finding that federal judicial power incorporates stare decisis).  
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Fourth, in the heart of the Article, Part V, I explain the roles of 
originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication, described by the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward precedent. The 
Interpretative Approach is that originalist precedent serves the 
epistemic role of providing presumptive evidence of the original 
meaning and its proper application.13 The Constructive Approach is 
that originalist precedent serves the creative role of determining the 
defeasible content of the Constitution’s meaning.  
Then, in Part VI, I explain how the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches operate in practice. I show that originalist 
precedent serves the roles of implementing the original meaning, 
embedding the original meaning in constitutional law, and affecting 
other areas of constitutional law through its gravitational force. In so 
arguing, I will elucidate how the role of originalist precedent varies 
depending on whether the context is one of constitutional 
interpretation or constitutional construction.14  
Lastly, in Part VII, I argue that the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches increase originalism’s normative 
attractiveness and are therefore preferable to other conceptions of 
originalist precedent that do not. Part VIII concludes. 
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches offered in this 
Article complete the circle of my originalist theory of precedent. In 
an earlier article, I showed why and how judges should give 
nonoriginalist precedent significant respect.15 In this Article, I finish 
that project by showing how judges should give originalist precedent 
significant respect via the Interpretative and Constructive 
Approaches. 
 
 13. A handful of originalists have stated in passing that precedent “can provide epistemic 
guidance in the face of uncertain original meaning.” E.g., Barnett, Response, supra note 5, at 
1235. In this Article, I elaborate on that insight.  
 14. Stated briefly, constitutional interpretation occurs when the Constitution’s meaning 
provides a determinate answer to a legal question, while constitutional construction occurs 
when there is more than one answer consistent with, but not determined by the Constitution’s 
meaning. In these cases, a court must construct—create—constitutional meaning to decide the 
case. For example, the Commerce Clause determinatively answers, in the affirmative, the 
question of whether Congress can regulate freight trains traveling across state lines. This is 
constitutional interpretation. The question of whether Congress can regulate the Internet 
under its Commerce Clause authority is arguably constitutional construction.  
 15. Strang, supra note 5, at 472–84.  
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II. BACKGROUND DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRECEDENT IN ORIGINALISM: MOVING FROM NONORIGINALIST 
TO ORIGINALIST PRECEDENT 
A. Constitutional Precedent 
Despite—or, as I shall argue, out of faithfulness to—the central 
role of our written Constitution to our national legal and political 
life, constitutional adjudication has many of the characteristics of our 
broader common law legal practice and heritage.16 Indeed, this 
affinity has prompted an appreciable number of scholars to argue 
that there exist no significant differences between constitutional and 
common law adjudication.17 Less controversially, most constitutional 
scholars agree that constitutional precedent plays at least a significant 
role in American constitutional adjudication.18 For purposes of this 
Article, I need only briefly describe the commonly accepted aspects 
of constitutional precedent’s roles in constitutional adjudication 
because my claim is that the conception of originalist precedent I 
offer sufficiently incorporates those roles.  
Most importantly, precedent is a source of legal norms that 
resolve or help resolve later cases.19 Of similar importance is the role 
of precedent implementing the Constitution’s norms.20 
Constitutional precedent also structures the Supreme Court’s 
agenda, the cases it will and will not take.21 It “frame[s], inform[s], 
 
 16. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008) (providing the 
most recent comprehensive overview of the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication).  
 17. For the most widely-cited example of this genre see David Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 977 (2008) (arguing that 
common law constitutionalism is more normatively attractive than originalism); David A. 
Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969 (2008) 
(same).  
 18. There is a recently-labeled school of thought, the New Doctrinalists, that focuses on 
the role of legal doctrine. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 7; Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional 
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt 
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1649 (2005); see also Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008) (using the ideas from the New Doctrinalists to 
explain the “Dormant” Commerce Clause).  
 19. GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 147–53.  
 20. Id. at 172–76.  
 21. Id. at 153–55.  
DO NOT DELETE 2/1/2011 7:15 PM 
1729 An Originalist Theory of Precedent 
 1735 
and facilitate[s] a constitutional dialogue” in the nation.22 Further, it 
forms constitutional structures, such as the legal system.23 Other 
functions include: creating and chronicling history; educating 
Americans about the Constitution; symbolizing constitutional 
principles; and shaping national identity.24  
B. Nonoriginalist Precedent 
Originalists have offered a stunning variety of normative 
foundations for originalism, which I will not detail here.25 As 
originalism has matured, its proponents have begun to shift their 
focus from theoretical justifications for originalism to practical issues. 
Regarding the role of precedent, originalists initially focused their 
 
 22. Id. at 155–57.  
 23. Id. at 157–62.  
 24. Id. at 162–72.  
 25. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 54–68, 109–13 (arguing that originalism best 
protects natural rights); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–59 (1999) (grounding 
originalism in popular sovereignty); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our 
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 802–05 (2002) (arguing that 
originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that arise from the 
Constitution’s supermajority requirements); Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible 
Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the 
Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 983–97 (2005) 
(arguing that originalism best secures human flourishing). Lawrence Solum has also argued 
that one version of originalism, what he calls Semantic Originalism, is compatible with most 
normative justifications for originalism. Solum, supra note 11, at 128–34.  
  Originalists argue that judges are bound by and must enforce the constitutional 
text’s original meaning. The text’s original meaning is the publicly understood meaning of the 
Constitution’s text when it was ratified. Judges today may access this meaning through a 
primarily historical inquiry. Judges first look to the Constitution’s text and structure: what is 
the term or phrase at issue and how is it used elsewhere in the Constitution? (For an excellent 
discussion of this aspect of original meaning interpretation, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).) Judges also ascertain the meaning of the 
text in contemporary linguistic practice, drawing on the text’s usage in public discourse. For 
example, a judge would look at the use of the term “commerce” in the Framing and 
Ratification conventions. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 313 (summarizing the Commerce 
Clause’s original meaning after utilizing this source of data, among others). Judges further 
review the social, cultural, philosophical, and religious background at the time.   
  Originalism, as a modern movement in the legal academy, began in response to the 
perceived excesses of the Warren Court.  During the 1970s and 1980s, originalists struggled in 
a less-than-receptive legal academy to explain the basics of originalism. Originalists paid less 
attention to the practical aspects of constitutional adjudication, including the role of 
constitutional precedent. O’NEILL, supra note 2, at 94–132 (describing the rise of modern 
originalist arguments).  
DO NOT DELETE 2/1/2011 7:15 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1736 
attention on the thorny problem of nonoriginalist precedent.26 
Originalists did so because of the common—and powerful—
argument used against originalism: that it was fatally compromised 
by the existence of well-entrenched and broadly accepted 
nonoriginalist precedent.27 As Henry Paul Monaghan stated, 
originalists “cannot reasonably argue that these [nonoriginalist] 
transformative changes should now be judicially overthrown.”28  
I have recently argued that significant respect is due 
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent because of the constitutional 
and societal goal of effectively pursuing the common good.29 I tied 
this normative claim to the Constitution’s command in Article III.30 
I then maintained that judges should overrule nonoriginalist 
constitutional precedent except when doing so would gravely harm 
the common good.31 Other originalist scholars have similarly begun 
to offer explanations of the status of nonoriginalist precedent.32 In 
this Article, I take the next step and describe the role of originalist 
precedent. The arguments in this Article therefore complement and 
build on my conclusions regarding nonoriginalist precedent. 
 
 26. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23, 24 (1994) (providing the first explicit discussion of nonoriginalist precedent).  
 27. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 7, at 3 (“As I argue at length, the originalist model 
departs radically from actual Supreme Court practice. As originalists themselves acknowledge, 
doctrines that are of central importance in contemporary constitutional law could not be 
justified on originalist grounds.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 133–34 (1991) (“[F]aithful 
adherents to original understanding face an inescapable dilemma[: t]hey either can strive to 
overrule the better part of constitutional doctrine and thereby thrust the world of 
constitutional law into turmoil, or they must abandon original understanding in numerous 
substantive areas in order to stabilize constitutional law.” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
 28. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 723, 739 (1988).  
 29. Strang, supra note 5, at 419. I describe the standard of Originalism in Good Faith 
infra Part III.C, to distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist precedents. This 
standard is different from the one I used in An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, 
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, and I intend Originalism in Good Faith to 
supersede my prior thoughts on this subject.  
 30. Id. at 420.  
 31. Id. at 419.  
 32. See sources cited, supra note 5. Professor Randy Barnett, with his characteristically 
incisive pen, has labeled those originalists who argue that originalism, properly understood, 
incorporates some form of stare decisis, “faint-hearted originalists.” Barnett, Response, supra 
note 5, at 1232. Others, including himself, whom he labels “fearless originalists,” largely reject 
stare decisis in constitutional interpretation. Id. at 1233.  
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C. Originalist Precedent 
A priori, there are three plausible conceptions of the status and 
role of originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication33: (1) 
originalist precedent plays no role in later courts’ analyses (the “get 
rid of it all” conception);34 (2) originalist precedent plays a role in 
later courts’ analyses—it influences the later courts’ decisions (the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches); and (3) originalist 
precedent entirely or substantially determines the outcomes of later 
courts’ analyses (the “common law constitutionalism” 
conception35).36 According to the “get rid of it all” conception, in 
each case presenting a question of constitutional meaning, the court 
must de novo re-evaluate the Constitution’s original meaning and de 
novo apply that meaning to the case. The “common law 
constitutionalism” conception requires a court to decide later cases 
on the basis of originalist precedent without regard for the 
Constitution’s original meaning. In other words, originalist 
precedent’s authority is not subject to rebuttal in light of evidence 
that the precedent incorrectly articulated or applied the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  
These first and third conceptions have their adherents.37 
However, for reasons I explain below, I believe that the second 
conception is the correct originalist stance. The second conception, 
 
 33. From an originalist perspective.  
 34. See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1208 (2008) (giving, as one of four possible meanings of 
stare decisis, that courts have “no obligation to adhere to decisions they disagree with”).  
 35. I intend this label to invoke Professor David Strauss’ theory of constitutional 
interpretation. Strauss, supra note 17; cf. Healy, supra note 34, at 1208–09 (noting the 
position that precedents have a “strong presumption” in their favor).  
 36. See Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 947, 947 (2008) (distinguishing between doctrinalists, who follow precedent, and 
documentarians, who primarily follow the Constitution’s text); Healy, supra note 34, at 1174 
(dividing scholarly responses to stare decisis in constitutional adjudication into three categories: 
scholars who argue that stare decisis is constitutionally required; scholars who argue that stare 
decisis is unconstitutional; and scholars who argue that Congress has the authority to 
determine the extent of stare decisis).  
 37. Compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of 
Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1210–11 (2008) (arguing that precedent can play a limited informational 
role, but that it does not have independent authority), with Lash, supra note 5, at 1441–42 
(arguing that an originalism justified by popular sovereignty maintains a role for precedent), 
and Solum, supra note 5, at 186–201 (advocating a “neoformalist” conception of 
constitutional stare decisis that significantly binds the Supreme Court).  
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what I label the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward 
originalist precedent, requires federal judges to give significant 
respect to originalist precedent in the form of presumptive authority 
in later cases. I designate this position the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches because of the primary roles originalist 
precedent plays under this conception. One is epistemic: originalist 
precedent bridges the analytic gap between the Constitution’s 
metaphysically determinate original meaning and the facts presented 
in a concrete case; and the other is metaphysical: originalist 
precedent determines the content of the Constitution’s norms when 
the Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically 
indeterminate.38  
As I noted earlier, originalists have not focused on the role of 
originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication. I have already 
offered one explanation why: originalists were focused on securing 
the foundations of originalism and have only recently begun to 
explore other implications of originalism. One prominent example of 
this phenomenon is the recent discussion on the possibility and 
implications of the distinction between constitutional interpretation 
and constitutional construction.39 The distinction was first proposed 
in originalist literature by Robert N. Clinton in 1987.40 From there, 
it was picked up and given prominence by Keith Whittington and 
Randy Barnett in 1999 and 2004, respectively.41 Today, there is a 
robust debate among originalists over the existence and scope of 
construction.42 Similarly, originalists are beginning to turn their 
 
 38. Unless noted otherwise, I use the term indeterminate as a shorthand for both 
indeterminate and underdeterminate.  
 39. I will discuss these concepts in greater detail later. At this point, let me say that 
constitutional interpretation is the process of elaborating determinate constitutional meaning, 
while construction is the creative process of fashioning constitutional meaning when the 
Constitution’s meaning is indeterminate.  
 40.  Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation 
of “This Constitution”, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1264 (1987). Professor Clinton relied on an 
earlier statement of the distinction in MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20 n.* (1982).  
 41. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 5–14, 42; BARNETT, supra note 3, at 118–30. 
Professor Whittington also devoted a book to the subject of constitutional constructions. 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).  
 42. See Solum, supra note 11, at 19–22 (detailing this divergence). Compare id. at 67–
87 (explaining constitutional construction and detailing the debate over it), with John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
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attention to other prominent facets of our legal practice, such as 
precedent.  
There are other reasons why originalists have not focused on 
originalist precedent. First, and perhaps most importantly, while 
there is substantial criticism of originalism on the basis of 
nonoriginalist precedent, there has been relatively little criticism 
based on originalist precedent.43 Originalists, therefore, could afford 
to focus on more pressing criticisms. Second, there is substantial 
disagreement among originalists on the role of nonoriginalist 
precedent, which has thus become a focus of scholarly efforts. Third, 
for those originalists whose understanding of originalism includes a 
role for originalist precedent, there was less incentive to explore the 
subject because it was not a significant point of controversy.  
III. DISTINGUISHING ORIGINALIST FROM NONORIGINALIST 
PRECEDENT: ORIGINALISM IN GOOD FAITH 
A. Introduction 
My explanation of the functions played by originalist precedent 
in constitutional adjudication depends on a distinction existing 
between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent and that 
participants in our legal practice have the capability to ascertain that 
distinction with reasonable accuracy. Below, I explain how litigants, 
judges, and scholars can access the distinction in a manner that 
makes the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward 
originalist precedent possible. After describing the two primary facets 
of an originalist precedent, I describe the standard I suggest courts 
should utilize: Originalism in Good Faith (“OGF”).44 Crucially, I 
end by showing that precedents established using OGF enjoy a 
presumption of validity in subsequent analogous cases. 
 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 783–86 (2009) 
(arguing for original methods originalism which may eliminate construction).  
 43. Professor Richard Fallon, though not focusing on originalist precedent, has strongly 
criticized originalism for failing to fit our legal practice’s commitment to stare decisis. FALLON, 
supra note 7, at 76–110.  
 44. I intend this label to invoke Steven J. Burton’s book and its thesis, that good faith 
judgments by judges are what our legal practice can and should expect of them. STEVEN J. 
BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH xii (1992).  
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B. Distinguishing Originalist from Nonoriginalist Precedent: A First 
Approximation 
The distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent 
is, at first blush, simple to describe. The distinction is between those 
cases where the Supreme Court properly interpreted—articulated—
and properly applied the Constitution’s original meaning,45 and 
those precedents where it did not. Originalist precedent is, therefore, 
correct, while nonoriginalist precedent is mistaken.46  
For a precedent to merit the label originalist, it must first 
correctly express the Constitution’s original meaning. There are a 
variety of ways in which the precedent could do this, ranging from 
an explicit statement of the original meaning, to an inarticulate 
expression of that meaning. Examples of the first sort are relatively 
easy to spot. In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court clearly 
stated, following its review of the history of the Confrontation 
Clause, the Clause’s original meaning: the Clause prohibited 
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear 
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”47  
Examples of precedents that state the Constitution’s original 
meaning opaquely are, by definition, more difficult to identify. In 
these cases, the Court does not explicitly articulate the 
Constitution’s meaning, leaving one to gather the meaning from 
other aspects of the opinion. For example, though the Court’s 
opinion in Printz v. United States is an originalist precedent, the 
precedent’s articulation of the original meaning is not 
perspicacious.48 Instead, Justice Scalia’s opinion draws on the rather 
ill defined “historical understanding and practice, . . . [and] the 
structure of the Constitution.”49  
Additionally, there are examples where the Court articulates the 
Constitution’s meaning without identifying it as original meaning, 
 
 45. See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 8 (“I understand ‘constitutional law’ to be the 
byproduct of the efforts undertaken by public authorities to determine constitutional meaning 
and to implement the Constitution.”).  
 46. This was my prior approach to the distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist 
precedent. See Strang, supra note 5, at 430–31 (describing nonoriginalist precedent as 
mistaken).  
 47. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).  
 48. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).  
 49. Id.   
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requiring one to determine whether the meaning articulated is the 
Constitution’s original meaning. Much of the Court’s case law in the 
antebellum period fits this description. The Court’s articulation of 
the Constitution’s meaning in the early Republic accorded with the 
acknowledged—originalist—interpretative norms of the period and 
hence was unreflectively originalist. As Jonathan O’Neill and 
Christopher Wolfe have demonstrated, originalism was simply the 
way to interpret legal texts.50 Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation 
of the Contracts Clause in Sturges v. Crowninshield provides a good 
example.51 To ascertain the “meaning of words in common use,” he 
relied on the federal structure of the United States, he reviewed the 
history surrounding the Framing and Ratification of the Clause, and 
he noted past practices by both the states and the federal 
government.52 
Precedents that opaquely articulate the original meaning are 
relatively rare today. This is the result of the movement toward 
originalism in response to the previous hegemony of nonoriginalist 
methodologies.53 Consequently, originalism was and remains 
controversial on the Court.54 Its use by its proponents is explicit as a 
way to show that the proponent’s result is principled (in its 
proponent’s eyes) and to contrast that principled result with the 
unprincipled result reached using nonoriginalist methods.  
Second, in order to be an originalist precedent, it must accurately 
apply the original meaning to the facts presented in the case. 
Ascertaining whether a court properly applied the original meaning 
 
 50. O’NEILL, supra note 2, at 12–18 (describing the Court’s use of originalism); 
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 17–72 (1986) (same); see 
also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 42, at 765–72 (2009) (reviewing the historical 
evidence and concluding that the method of interpretation utilized by the Framers and 
Ratifiers to interpret the Constitution was originalist); Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ 
Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 
1305 (2007) (reviewing the historical record and concluding that “[t]he Founders’ 
hermeneutic—how they expected the Constitution to be construed—rested on the text, of 
course, but also on the subjective understanding of the ratifiers. Where subjective 
understanding was not retrievable, the preferred substitute was original public meaning.”).  
 51. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 191–208 (1819).  
 52. Id.  
 53. See O’NEILL, supra note 2, at 67–160 (giving this history).  
 54. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 117–32 (2005) (arguing against originalism); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS 
IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005) (arguing 
that originalist “fundamentalist” judges are distorting constitutional law).  
DO NOT DELETE 2/1/2011 7:15 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1742 
falls on a continuum, with clearly correct and incorrect applications 
on each end, and in-between many cases where reasonable 
disagreement exists.  
The Constitution’s original meaning takes the form of legal 
norms—rules, standards, and principles55—that are more abstract 
than the given facts of a case.56 If the original meaning of a particular 
constitutional clause is a rule, for example, then that rule provides a 
norm more general than the class of fact situations to which it is 
potentially applicable. Consequently, a judge deciding whether 
and/or how to apply the rule must exercise judgment.  
Generally, the more abstract the norm a judge is applying, the 
greater the burden on the judge’s capacities to apply the norm 
correctly.57 The relative ease of correctly applying the Presidential 
Age Clause,58 compared with the relative difficulty of accurately 
applying the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures,59 exemplifies this.  
This simple statement is complicated, however, by the existence 
of archetypal cases which, even within the context of an abstract 
originalist norm, can make application of such a norm easier.60 For 
instance, even if the Equal Protection Clause’s original meaning is a 
relatively abstract principle,61 application of that principle to legal 
impediments to racial minorities purchasing property would remain 
an easy case. This is because one of the archetypal practices outlawed 
by the Clause’s original norm was black codes which, among other 
 
 55. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle 
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed 
Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 942–56 (2009) (describing this aspect of the 
Constitution’s original meaning).   
 56. See BURTON, supra note 44, at 28, 68 (noting that reasons are of greater abstraction 
than the actions they govern).  
 57. See I-II, SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 94, Art. 4 (Benziger 
Bros. ed., Dominican Fathers trans. 1947) (“The practical reason . . . is busied with contingent 
matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is 
necessity in the general principles [of natural law], the more we descend to matters of detail, 
the more frequently we encounter defects.”).  
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“neither shall any person be eligible to that 
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years”).  
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 60. See Strang, Originalism, supra note 55, at 956 (describing archetypal cases); see also 
JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
178–95 (2001) (describing the similar concept of paradigm cases).  
 61. As Ronald Dworkin has asserted is the case, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 9–11 (1996).  
DO NOT DELETE 2/1/2011 7:15 PM 
1729 An Originalist Theory of Precedent 
 1743 
things, prevented newly-freed black Americans from buying and 
selling property.62  
C. Ability and Limits of Ascertaining the Distinction: Originalism in 
Good Faith 
1. Originalism in Good Faith as an objective standard 
Originalism in Good Faith is the standard interpreters should 
utilize to determine whether a precedent is originalist or 
nonoriginalist. A precedent meets this standard if it is an objectively 
good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original 
meaning.  
Originalism in Good Faith’s core inquiry is: does the precedent 
in question show an objectively good faith attempt to articulate and 
apply the Constitution’s original meaning?63 The inquiry’s focus is 
primarily on the precedent itself.64 Therefore, a precedent is an 
originalist precedent even if later in the author’s personal papers it 
came to light that the author deceitfully, though plausibly, used 
originalist arguments to reach what, in the author’s mind, was a 
nonoriginalist result. The precedent remained an originalist 
precedent because it plausibly articulated and applied the original 
meaning.  
The inquiry is focused on a precedent’s meeting the objective 
standard of OGF, not on the subjective beliefs of the precedent’s 
author. Continuing the previous example, a precedent whose author 
subjectively believed that the precedent did not accurately articulate 
or apply the original meaning, when in fact the precedent plausibly 
did so, is an originalist precedent.  
This makes OGF different from prominent notions of good faith 
in other areas of law.65 For example, the UCC requires that parties 
execute and perform contracts in good faith.66 The UCC’s definition 
 
 62. RUBENFELD, supra note 60, at 182.  
 63. See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 508 (2008) 
(stating that when “prior decisions do not even purport to be based on original meaning,” the 
decisions are erroneous).  
 64. Other data bearing on whether the precedent is an objectively good faith attempt to 
articulate and apply the original meaning is also pertinent. For example, if the precedent’s 
author is a well known originalist or nonoriginalist, that is relevant data, though not necessarily 
of significant weight.  
 65. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990).  
 66. Id.  
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of good faith requires both “honesty in fact” and commercially 
reasonable standards.67 In other words, the UCC definition of good 
faith has both an objective and a subjective component.  
Originalism in Good Faith, by contrast, does not delve into a 
precedent’s author’s (or authors’) subjective beliefs. Instead, OGF 
operates like qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects 
government officials from liability if their discretionary actions were 
objectively reasonable.68  
Originalism in Good Faith’s objective standard is more 
appropriate than a subjective standard for a number of reasons. Most 
importantly, courts rarely delve into the subjective views of judges 
who authored precedents, either in the context of vertical stare 
decisis or horizontal stare decisis. Instead, a precedent is taken at face 
value, as standing or falling on its own merits. Originalism in Good 
Faith fits this practice.  
Originalism in Good Faith’s objective inquiry is relatively easy to 
perform because the main data—the precedent—is readily available. 
By contrast, a subjective inquiry would open the possibility of 
scholars and litigants delving into the nonjudicial utterances of 
judges to try to show subjective bad faith. This broadening of the 
inquiry would undermine Rule of Law values by undermining (what 
reasonably appear to be) originalist precedents based on a judge’s 
subjective views and by including in the data relevant to the law69 
materials that are less accessible than the originalist precedent itself.  
Relatedly, inquiry into judges’ subjective views would prove 
disruptive to the judicial process because judges could be reversed 
and overruled based on claims of bad faith. It would also discourage 
qualified personnel from accepting judicial office because of the 
intrusive search into judges’ nonjudicial writings and statements. 
Judicial office itself would become more like the contentious and 
invasive confirmation process.  
There is also little need for a subjective standard because the 
error rate of OGF will be low. An objective standard will “catch” 
many precedents motivated by subjective bad faith. At the same 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that 
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).  
 69. The judge’s personal papers, for example.  
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time, the objective standard is protective of precedents that evince a 
plausible attempt to articulate and apply the original meaning.  
Originalism in Good Faith’s objective standard is also one that 
judges can meet. Although the level of effort needed to meet the 
standard will vary based on the accessibility of the original meaning 
and the difficulty of applying the original meaning to the question of 
the case, judges have the resources to do so.  
Lastly, an objective standard fulfills OGF’s goal of providing a 
workable benchmark to differentiate originalist precedents from 
nonoriginalist precedents. For OGF to be practicable—to preserve 
the precedents’ work—the effort required to differentiate originalist 
precedents from nonoriginalist precedents must be lower than that 
required to conduct a de novo review of the Constitution’s original 
meaning. Otherwise, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches 
would take just as much work as the “get rid of it all” conception of 
originalist precedent, and my conception of precedent would 
collapse into the “get rid of it all” conception. Originalism in Good 
Faith avoids this pitfall by adopting an objective good faith standard 
that permits participants in the legal practice to relatively easily 
identify originalist precedents.  
2. Measuring the objective good faith of originalist precedent 
There is no set metric to ascertain whether a particular precedent 
is a good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution’s 
original meaning. Instead, one must look for indications that the 
judge acted in good faith. For example, did the judge plausibly 
review the pertinent data to articulate the Constitution’s original 
meaning? If not, that is a significant warning that the judge was not 
in good faith articulating the original meaning. Or, did the judge 
plausibly respond to credible counter-arguments put forward by the 
dissent that the original meaning’s application led to a contrary 
result? If not, that is a significant indication that the judge did not in 
good faith apply the original meaning.  
The ability of later participants in our legal practice to label a 
precedent originalist will vary based on a number of factors. These 
factors include: the type of analysis used in the precedent; the 
interpretative commitments of the precedent’s author, if known; the 
time period and interpretative milieu in which the precedent was 
written; whether the precedent is prima facie consistent with the 
text’s known original meaning; whether the precedent plausibly 
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responds to then-available counter-arguments; and whether there are 
indications that the result is inconsistent with proper application of 
the articulated original meaning. In practice, the ease of determining 
whether a precedent is originalist will vary. For instance, if the 
precedent explicitly reviewed the text, structure, and history of the 
constitutional text in question, then that weighs strongly in favor of 
designating it an originalist precedent.  
Originalism in Good Faith operates analogously to the 
administrative review standard labeled “hard look” review.70 Hard 
look review is employed when federal courts review discretionary 
administrative agency determinations.71 To receive enforcement of its 
action by a federal court, an administrative agency must show that its 
decision-making process was reasoned: the agency took into account 
all pertinent data, responded to reasonable counter-arguments, and 
explained why it reached its conclusion.72 Similarly, for a precedent 
to merit the label “originalist,” it should take into account the data 
regarding the constitutional provision’s original meaning, explain 
what original meaning results from that data, then, apply that 
original meaning to the facts of the case, and in doing so, respond to 
plausible counterpoints.73  
3. Originalism in Good Faith is the appropriate standard to distinguish 
between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent 
Originalism in Good Faith is, for a number of reasons, the 
appropriate standard to distinguish originalist from nonoriginalist 
precedents.74 First, OGF meets the mandate of originalism because it 
accords the Constitution’s original meaning authoritative status. The 
 
 70. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (using hard look review).  
 71. See 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 10.5 Hard Look  (2d ed. 1997) 
(“Courts have developed an expression of a limited review function, called the ‘hard look’ 
doctrine. This word formula is related to the arbitrariness standard and is appropriate in several 
situations calling for arbitrariness type review.”).  
 72. Id.  
 73. I do not intend to suggest that the strictness of the scrutiny applied using 
Originalism in Good Faith is identical to that used during hard look review. Instead, the 
analogy is meant to draw out the aspects of decision-making.  
 74. For the reasons stated in the text, I conclude that Originalism in Good Faith is 
superior to a standard that looks only to the correctness or incorrectness of a precedent, which 
is commonly taken as the dividing line between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent. See 
Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, supra note 63, at 509 (using the standard demarcation line).  
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interpreter’s final purpose75 is the original meaning’s accurate 
description and application. The interpreter tests pertinent 
precedents against the original meaning to ascertain whether the 
precedent is an originalist precedent.  
In practice, judges who in good faith strive to articulate and 
apply the Constitution’s original meaning will regularly succeed. For 
this reason, it is significantly more likely that opinions written by 
originalists, such as Justices Scalia76 or Thomas,77 in a self-consciously 
originalist manner, will respect the original meaning, than are 
opinions written in a self-consciously nonoriginalist manner by 
nonoriginalists, such as Justice Douglas.78 
Second, OGF accepts that precedents which meet the good faith 
standard it embodies will sometimes be mistaken. Since the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward originalist 
precedent give originalist precedent only a presumption of 
bindingness—which can be overcome—good faith mistakes will be 
corrected. This prevents precedent from permanently displacing the 
authoritative original meaning.79  
Third, OGF sets the standard at what we should expect of judges. 
If originalism is the correct method of interpreting the Constitution, 
 
 75. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 1013a (Hugh Tredennick trans., 1975) (describing a 
subject’s final cause as the “end” and the purpose for which something exists).  
 76. Perhaps the best example of Justice Scalia, in good faith, articulating and applying 
the Constitution’s original meaning is his majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as 
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246 (2008) (“District of Columbia v. Heller is the most 
explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.”).  
 77. A good example of Justice Thomas articulating and applying the Constitution’s 
original meaning in good faith is in his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), superseded by statue, Gun Free School Zones of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(f) (1996) as recognized in U.S. v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038 
(8th Cir. 1999).  
 78. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases 
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”); see also James A. Gardner, 
State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1762 n.131 (2003) (“Justice William O. Douglas utilized a 
distinctly nonoriginalist methodology in numerous cases.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism 
as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1624 (1989) (“Griswold v. Connecticut [is] 
usually branded by originalists as a nonoriginalist opinion.”).   
 79. See Kermit Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the 
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005) (describing “constitutional calcification,” which 
occurs when judicial doctrine entirely displaces “constitutional values”).  
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then judges must utilize it to fulfill their oaths.80 And their good 
faith efforts to articulate and apply the original meaning are necessary 
to utilize originalist interpretation. 
Relatedly, OGF sets the standard at what we may, as a practical 
matter, expect of judges. It is futile to require the unerring 
articulation of the Constitution’s original meaning and the unerring 
application of that meaning, because that standard is unattainable. 
This is why Ronald Dworkin had to create the hypothetical judge, 
Hercules, to exemplify his theory of law.81 As Dworkin concluded, 
regarding why the flesh-and-blood humans that populate the bench 
would make mistakes, “the . . . judges of the past did not all have 
Hercules’ ability or insight.”82 By contrast, a good faith attempt by a 
judge to articulate and apply the original meaning is attainable. 
Indeed, our legal practice already demands good faith by judges.83 
Of course, to meet the standard set by OGF, a precedent must 
evince a good faith effort to recover and apply the Constitution’s 
original meaning. Consequently, the mantle of “originalist judge” 
will not, by itself, meet the standard. Instead, the authoring judge 
must “do the work” of explaining the Constitution’s original 
meaning and of justifying how that original meaning leads to the 
judge’s conclusion. There are cases where well-known originalist 
Justices have authored arguably nonoriginalist opinions. Randy 
Barnett, for instance, has argued that Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
Gonzales v. Raich84 fits this description.85 
Originalism in Good Faith hinges on judges exercising good 
faith judgment. Like any theory of precedent, the substantive 
content of precedents will hinge on the authors’ judgment of what 
 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2009); see also Nash E. Long, The 
“Constitutional Remand”: Judicial Review of Constitutionally Dubious Statutes, 14 J.L. & POL. 
667, 682–85 (1998) (reviewing the original meaning of the Clause).  
 81. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977) (“I have invented . . . 
a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules.”).  
 82. Id. at 119.  
 83. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A (2009) (“A judge 
should respect and comply with the law . . . .”); id. at Canon 3A (“A judge should be faithful 
to . . . the law . . . .”).  
 84. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that Congress has authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate noneconomic 
intrastate activities that substantially impact interstate commerce).  
 85. Randy E. Barnett, The Choice Between Madison and FDR, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1005, 1014 (2008); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” 
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 14–15 (2006).  
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the original meaning required. For instance, in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, Justice Stevens’ dissent86 plausibly reviewed the Second 
Amendment’s original meaning and plausibly applied that meaning 
to the facts of the case.87 Thus, Justice Stevens’ dissent meets OGF’s 
requirements. If Justice Stevens could have garnered one more vote, 
his dissent, and not Justice Scalia’s opinion, would have received the 
deference due under OGF.88 This possibility is an unavoidable part of 
practical human institutions. It also afflicts all plausible interpretative 
methodologies that depend on fallible human judgment.89  
4. Originalism in Good Faith distinguished from other conceptions of 
originalist precedent 
Originalism in Good Faith is not the first possible conception of 
originalist precedent; it is not “get rid of it all.”90 Therefore, some 
precedent that meets the standard of OGF will, in fact, incorrectly 
articulate and/or apply the original meaning.91 However, this error 
rate has minimal costs, and OGF is superior to the first position. As I 
argued above, OGF’s error rate is low because it strives for and 
generally produces correct precedent.92  
Originalism in Good Faith is also superior to the “get rid of it 
all” conception because it fits our legal practice which gives a 
significant role to stare decisis. Originalism in Good Faith also 
preserves the original meaning’s authority by ensuring that later 
 
 86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 87. Id. at 2824 (“In this dissent I shall first explain why our decision in Miller was 
faithful to the text of the Second Amendment and the purposes revealed in its drafting history. 
I shall then comment on the postratification history of the Amendment . . . .”).  
 88. From my own reading of the history, Justice Stevens incorrectly articulated the 
Second Amendment’s original meaning. If true, then the hypothetical majority Stevens opinion 
would be an incorrect—though still originalist—precedent.  
 89. For example, Dworkin’s law-as-integrity methodology, which requires judges to 
articulate the morally best interpretation of the pertinent legal data, places tremendous burdens 
on a judge’s judgment and hence is significantly open to error. This burden is one reason why 
Dworkin, like other scholars, spends a significant portion of his scholarship criticizing judicial 
judgment as erroneous. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 147–48 (listing some erroneous 
decisions).  
 90.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 91. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 836 (“It would be wonderful if 
constitutional decision-makers never made any mistakes. But in the real world . . . such 
mistakes are not infrequent . . . .”).  
 92. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (arguing that Originalism in Good 
Faith gives pride of place to the Constitution’s original meaning).  
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courts may overrule incorrect originalist precedents. Finally, any 
uncorrected errors are likely relatively close to the correct original 
meaning because the precedent qualified as an originalist precedent, 
but criticism did not overcome the presumption in its favor.  
Likewise, OGF is not the third possible conception of originalist 
precedent; it is not the “common law constitutionalism” conception. 
Consequently, OGF may—though there are significant arguments to 
the contrary93—result in more instability than this third alternative. 
However, OGF preserves much of the value advanced by the 
“common law constitutionalism” conception by protecting 
originalist precedent with a presumption. Unlike “common law 
constitutionalism,” however, OGF also protects values advanced by 
originalism.94 
Adopting OGF means that I must revise my previous statements 
regarding the demarcation between originalist and nonoriginalist 
precedent. I previously argued that the distinction was synonymous 
with correct and incorrect precedents.95 Under OGF, however, a 
precedent may be an originalist precedent—because it met the 
objective good faith standard—while at the same time being 
incorrect—because the precedent incorrectly articulated and/or 
incorrectly applied the original meaning. This should not be 
surprising. Any requirement that asks for good faith effort from 
fallible human actors, while disclaiming perfection, may result in 
substantively mistaken actions.96  
 
 93. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 326–31 (2005) (arguing that originalism provides 
more stability than common law constitutionalism). The argument that the common law 
constitutionalism conception is more normatively attractive because it more strongly supports 
stability is especially weak when contrasted with an originalism that preserves a place for some 
nonoriginalist precedent, as mine does. See Strang, supra note 5, at 442–47 (arguing that 
preserving some nonoriginalist precedent serves the common good by preserving rule-of-law 
values).  
 94. One practical import of Originalism in Good Faith and the presumption accorded 
originalist precedents is that research on the Constitution’s original meaning would receive 
greater prominence. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 334 (arguing that if originalism were to 
become more prominent, judges, scholars, and attorneys would quickly develop the skill set 
necessary to operate effectively in that environment). The demand would be greater for 
research to both confirm and rebut the presumption favoring an originalist precedent. Further, 
attorneys litigating constitutional issues would focus more of their energies on originalist 
arguments. 
 95. Strang, supra note 5, at 430.  
 96. Adopting Originalism in Good Faith does not substantially modify my previous 
conclusions regarding nonoriginalist precedent. Previously, I argued that federal judges should 
overrule constitutional precedent when it incorrectly articulated or applied the original 
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D. Presumptively Binding 
Originalist precedent that meets the OGF standard is protected 
by a rebuttable presumption. Litigants, scholars, and judges may 
rebut the presumption by showing that (1) there is not substantial 
evidence that the originalist precedent in question correctly 
articulated the original meaning and/or (2) there is not substantial 
evidence that the precedent correctly applied that meaning.97  
The presumption in favor of originalist precedent is strong 
enough that it protects originalist precedents from destabilizing 
challenges and thereby prevents my conception of originalist 
precedent from collapsing into the “get rid of it all” conception. At 
the same time, the presumption is low enough that litigants, 
scholars, and judges can effectively challenge precedents.98 This 
prevents my conception from sliding into the “common law 
constitutionalism” conception of precedent and, most importantly, 
preserves the primacy of the Constitution’s original meaning.  
The presumption gives originalist precedent its privileged place 
in constitutional adjudication. It protects originalist precedent from 
subsequent scrutiny and challenge. It also ensures that originalist 
precedent receives the constitutionally mandated “significant 
respect,” described below.  
E. Summary 
Originalism in Good Faith, which asks judges to faithfully 
articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning, provides a 
practical means of distinguishing originalist precedent from 
 
meaning, unless doing so would significantly harm the common good. Originalism in Good 
Faith, by contrast, requires federal judges to overrule constitutional precedent when it does not 
evince an objectively good faith attempt to articulate or apply the original meaning, unless 
doing so would significantly harm the common good. Stated differently, Originalism in Good 
Faith somewhat reduces the class of constitutional precedents labeled nonoriginalist 
precedents.  
 97. Thomas Healy explained a similar level of respect for precedent. See Healy, supra 
note 34, at 1209 (explaining what he labels a “moderate presumption” in favor of precedent). 
Randy Barnett has suggested what appears to be a lower level of respect for precedent. See 
Barnett, supra note 63, at 508 (stating that “precedent can . . . play an epistemic role, placing 
some burden on a court to justify its departure from prior decisions”).  
 98. The presumption in favor of originalist precedent is not as powerful as that 
identified by Professor Caleb Nelson, “demonstrably wrong.” Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and 
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2001). My substantial-evidence 
standard permits more frequent rebuttal of the presumption.  
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nonoriginalist precedent. Originalism in Good Faith is also superior 
to the other plausible conceptions of originalist precedent.99 Having 
established a framework by which to distinguish originalist from 
nonoriginalist precedent, I now explain how the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches toward precedent fit Article III’s 
requirement that federal judges give constitutional precedent 
significant respect.  
IV. THE INTERPRETATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES MEET 
ARTICLE III’S REQUIREMENT THAT FEDERAL JUDGES GIVE 
SIGNIFICANT RESPECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT 
An originalist theory of precedent does not warrant the 
appellation “originalist” if it does not comport with the 
Constitution’s original meaning. In this Part, I briefly review the 
original meaning of “judicial Power” in Article III. Article III 
requires federal judges to give precedent significant respect. This is 
important because it will enable me to show how the Interpretative 
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent meet the 
Constitution’s command. Hence, my conception of originalist 
precedent merits the label originalist.  
In a previous article, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: 
Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good,100 I 
conducted a broad-ranging and in-depth review of the original 
meaning of “judicial Power” in Article III. I started with English 
legal practice and then continued with early colonial practice, 
revolutionary American practice, American practice at the time of the 
Framing and Ratification, and post-Ratification practice until 
1800.101 While some times and places—such as early-American 
colonial practice102—were exceptional, the surprisingly consistent 
legal practice was to give precedent significant respect.103  
 
 99.   In Part VII, I will offer further reasons to believe that OGF is a superior conception 
of originalist precedent.   
 100. Strang, supra note 5.  
 101. Id. at 447–71.  
 102. See id. at 452–57 (describing how, because of contingent sociological circumstances, 
such as limited case reporters, the practice of precedent evolved from a weaker form of respect 
for precedent to a more robust conception, like that in England).  
 103. See id. at 452 (“Americans had an understanding and practice of precedent, which 
developed over time from the colonial era to the Ratification of the Constitution. By the time 
of the Ratification, the Framers and Ratifiers understood judicial power to include stare decisis; 
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I found that English legal practice was characterized by the 
declaratory or evidentiary theory of precedent.104 Under this view, 
precedents are not themselves the law but are instead the best 
evidence of the underlying common law principles of which the 
precedents are a manifestation.105 The declaratory theory of 
precedent required later judges to give precedent significant respect. 
Only if a precedent was “flatly absurd or unjust” could a later judge 
depart from it.106 
American practice prior to the Revolution, after some initial 
hesitancy caused by the challenging circumstances presented by the 
colonial experience, adopted the declaratory theory of precedent.107 
Adherence to this traditional conception of stare decisis continued 
into the Framing and Ratification period.108  
During the Framing and Ratification, all references to “judicial 
Power” I uncovered that referenced stare decisis or precedent, either 
explicitly stated or assumed as part of a larger argument, that federal 
judges would create and in turn be bound by constitutional 
precedent.109 It is telling that both proponents and opponents of the 
proposed constitution relied on the assumption that federal judges 
would give significant respect to constitutional precedent in order to 
make other, controversial arguments. 
For instance, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 argued for the 
controversial proposition that Article III’s protections for federal 
judges, most importantly tenure and salary protections, were 
appropriate.110 To support this heavily contested portion of the 
Constitution, Hamilton relied on the uncontroversial claim that 
federal judges would create and, in turn, be bound by constitutional 
precedent. Hamilton argued that “the records of [federal] 
precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and 
must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent 
 
judges must give significant respect to prior analogous cases and must give significant reasons 
for overruling precedents.”).  
 104. Id. at 447–52.  
 105. Id. This is, of course, an epistemic role for precedent. 
 106. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70.  
 107. Strang, supra note 5, at 452–57.  
 108. Id. at 457–62.  
 109. Id. at 462–67.  
 110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 463–471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003). 
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knowledge of them.”111 To entice the best lawyers to serve on the 
federal bench, Hamilton contended, the Constitution properly 
granted tenure and salary protections. Otherwise, few successful 
attorneys would engage in the “long and laborious study” necessary 
to master precedent that was the core of a federal judge’s job.112 
Others made similar use of the assumption that federal judges would 
give significant respect to constitutional precedent.113 
Following Ratification and the creation of the new federal 
judiciary, all participants in the legal practice gave precedent 
significant respect. Indeed, judges, litigants, and even the court 
reporters utilized precedent as one of the central tools in legal 
argument.114 Alexander Dallas, for example, who was the Supreme 
Court’s first reporter, regularly commented on the parties’ 
precedent-based arguments in notes in his reports.115 
Later scholarship on this point has not challenged, and instead, 
those scholarly efforts that reviewed the historical record have 
supported my basic conclusions.116 For instance, Professors McGinnis 
and Rappaport, after reviewing the evidence surrounding the original 
meaning of judicial power, determined that “there is a strong case 
for concluding that the Constitution incorporates a minimal degree 
of precedent within the judicial power.”117 
 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. 
 113. See Strang, supra note 5, at 462–63 (describing Anti-Federalist arguments that 
relied on this assumption).  
 114. Id. at 467–71.  
 115. See, e.g., Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666, 667 n.2 (D.C.D. Pa. 1789) (No. 
11,754).  
 116. Professor Thomas Healy recently reaffirmed his prior conclusion that “judicial 
Power” did not incorporate a conception of stare decisis. Healy, supra note 34, at 1180–81. 
Professor Healy concluded that he and I “simply interpet[ed] the facts differently.” Id. at 
1181. This is true, as far as it goes, though my claim was that my description of the history was 
more accurate for many reasons, including my reconciliation of a previous scholarly divergence 
on the extent to which post-Revolutionary states followed stare decisis. Strang, supra note 5, at 
458–62. (In doing so, I mistakenly stated that Healy cited only two instances of overruling 
domestic cases when he had cited seven such cases. Id. at 459.) I also reviewed new data to 
support my conclusion including my review of pre-1800 federal court practice. Id. at 467–71.  
 117. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 806; see also Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, 
Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 
633 (2009) (concluding that stare decisis has “constitutional status”). However, Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport find that “[t]he constitutionally required precedent rule . . . is . . . 
narrow in scope.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 825.  
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Having established that Article III requires judges to utilize 
constitutional precedent and a method by which to evaluate that 
precedent—OGF—I proceed below to describe the Interpretative 
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent. I explain 
how they give significant respect to precedent and enable judges to 
meet Article III’s requirement. They do this by according originalist 
precedent a presumption of correctness, in the case of the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches, and, additionally, by 
according defeasible bindingness in the case of the Constructive 
Approach.  
V. THE INTERPRETATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES 
TOWARD ORIGINALIST PRECEDENT 
A. Introduction 
In this Part, I describe the characteristics of the Interpretative 
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent. I tie this 
conception of originalist precedent to the distinction between 
constitutional interpretation and construction.118 I also show that 
this conception is further supported by and derivative of the 
distinction between metaphysical and epistemic determinacy. Lastly, 
I tie all these points together to give a robust account of the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches.  
B. Preliminary Description of the Interpretative and Constructive 
Approaches 
The Interpretative Approach toward originalist precedent treats 
originalist precedent—that is, precedent that meets the OGF 
standard—as providing the presumptively correct articulation and 
application of the Constitution’s original meaning. Judges should 
utilize the Interpretative Approach when the Constitution’s original 
meaning is determinate,119 and when its meaning is metaphysically 
determinate but epistemically indeterminate. Originalist precedent in 
this context does not create the Constitution’s governing norms, and 
instead it is only an explication of the Constitution’s determinate 
original meaning in a particular factual context.  
 
 118. Though, this is a reasonably contested position. See supra note 14 (discussing 
originalist differences on the existence and extent of constitutional construction).  
 119. That is, when the meaning is both metaphysically and epistemically determinate.  
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Under the Interpretative Approach, originalist precedent governs 
later cases so long as the presumption in its favor remains 
unrebutted. If later judges, litigants, or scholars rebut the 
presumption, then the precedent loses its bindingness on later cases, 
and later judges should use their own good faith judgment to 
articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning de novo.  
The Constructive Approach toward originalist precedent treats 
originalist precedent as providing the defeasibly correct construction 
of the Constitution’s meaning. Judges should utilize the 
Constructive Approach when the Constitution’s original meaning is 
metaphysically indeterminate. Originalist precedent, in this context, 
creates—determines—the Constitution’s governing norms. 
However, the precedent’s determination of the Constitution’s 
meaning is defeasible in light of a differing constitutional 
construction by the elected branches, for reasons I have explained 
elsewhere.120 
As with the Interpretative Approach, originalist precedent that 
constructs constitutional meaning is protected by a rebuttable 
presumption. If later judges, litigants, or scholars show that the 
Constitution’s original meaning—indeterminate though it is—
excludes the precedent’s construction, then the presumption is 
overcome. Similarly, if later arguments are offered showing that the 
precedent’s application of the constructed meaning is wrong, then 
the presumption is overcome.  
C. Distinction Between Interpretation and Construction, and Why It 
Matters to Originalist Precedent 
The arguments I make in this Article regarding the Interpretative 
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent assume 
the validity of the distinction between interpretation and 
construction. I draw this distinction primarily from Professors 
Whittington, Barnett, and Solum.121 They argue that interpretation is 
 
 120. See Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 70–72 (2005) (making these arguments); see also 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 7–13 (arguing that constitutional construction is a political 
act of creation).  
 121. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 118–30 (explaining constitutional construction and 
how it differs from interpretation); WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 5–14 (same); Solum, 
supra note 11, at 67–87 (explaining constitutional construction and detailing the debate over 
it). 
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“a search for meaning already in the text,”122 while construction is 
the creative “construction of meaning” to fill in gaps left after 
interpretation is completed.123 I have argued elsewhere that federal 
judges must enforce interpretations of the Constitution against the 
contrary interpretations of the elected branches, but that they must 
defer to the elected branches regarding constitutional 
constructions.124 This Article follows that approach.  
The distinction between interpretation and construction flows 
from the distinction between determinate and indeterminate law.125 
The law is determinate when its application determines the outcome 
of a legal case—there is one right answer to a legal question126—
while the law is indeterminate when it limits the outcomes of a legal 
case but does not mandate one outcome.127 Likewise, interpretation 
is the articulation of the Constitution’s meaning, while construction 
is the choosing of a meaning that is limited by the Constitution, but 
not determined by it.  
Originalist precedent that interprets the Constitution is binding 
on subsequent analogous cases. Precedent that involves 
constitutional constructions is also binding on subsequent analogous 
cases. However, as I will describe below, because it involves 
constructions and not interpretations, its bindingness is also 
defeasible through contrary constructions by the elected branches.  
The role of constitutional construction is controversial within 
originalism, and many scholars have put forward thoughtful 
arguments. In this Article, I avoid taking sides in that debate. 
Instead, assuming that constitutional construction exists within a 
fully articulated originalism, I describe the role of originalist 
precedent within it.  
 
 122. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 6.  
 123. Id. at 7–8.  
 124. Strang, supra note 5, at 439–40.  
 125. See id. at 439–44 (discussing the relationship between determinacy and 
constitutional constructions in constitutional interpretation).  
 126. See id. at 426–29, 439.  
 127. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987).  
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D. Distinction Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Legal 
Determinacy, and Its Support for the Interpretative and Constructive 
Approaches 
Building on the previous Section’s distinction between 
constitutional interpretation and construction, in this Section I show 
that originalist precedent has an epistemic role in the context of 
interpretation, and that it plays a metaphysical role in the context of 
construction. First, however, I describe the distinction between 
epistemic and metaphysical determinacy upon which my argument is 
built.128 I demonstrate that the Interpretative Approach toward 
originalist precedent is appropriate when the law is metaphysically 
and epistemically determinate. It is also applicable when the law is 
metaphysically determinate and epistemically indeterminate. The 
Constructive Approach, though, applies when the Constitution’s 
original meaning is metaphysically and epistemically indeterminate.  
The distinction between metaphysical and epistemic legal 
determinacy is, respectively, between whether the law is in fact 
determinate, and whether participants in our legal practice can 
ascertain whether the law is determinate.129 The law is metaphysically 
determinate when there is one right answer to a case. This is true 
even if participants in our legal practice are unable to ascertain what 
the law is (that is, the law is epistemically indeterminate).  
The law is epistemically determinate when the law is 
metaphysically determinate and participants in our legal practice can 
ascertain that the law is determinate.130 Our legal practice, which 
aspires toward liberal legality and hence law-governed human 
activity,131 aims toward epistemic determinacy.132 There is a 
 
 128. The best discussion in the law review literature on this distinction remains Ken 
Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 134 (1990).  
 129. I do not address the question of who or what is the relevant standard for 
determining epistemological determinacy and instead use the capacious phrase, “participants in 
our legal practice,” to avoid the issue. I also elide the question of what level of consensus 
among participants is necessary to qualify for determinacy.  
 130. The law can also be epistemically determinate and metaphysically indeterminate. 
Stated differently, participants in our legal practice know that there is no right answer.  
 131. See BURTON, supra note 44, at 10 (arguing that if a judge’s judgment is not law-
bound then “it may seem[] judges must resolve indeterminacies on the basis of controversial 
political values—not the law.”). 
 132. See id. at 10–11 (arguing that “stubborn legal indeterminacy need not be 
pervasive”). 
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consensus, however, that it does not achieve that goal, at least not 
always.133 
The effort and judgment that is required to accurately ascertain 
whether the law is determinate varies. In the vast majority of possible 
cases—especially in “easy cases”134—the effort is minimal. By 
contrast, in the subset of epistemically determinate cases where the 
burdens on legal reasoning are the highest—those cases that are 
close to the line of being epistemically indeterminate—the 
evidentiary function of precedent under the Interpretative Approach 
is most robust.135 
The law is epistemically indeterminate when, despite its 
metaphysical determinacy, participants in our legal practice cannot 
ascertain the law’s content. Stated differently, in some cases, even 
though there is “one right answer,”136 legal actors cannot discover 
that answer. Part of the reason for this inability to access the law’s 
determinate content are limitations imposed by the human 
condition.137 Unlike Hercules, legal actors do not have—to pick just 
 
 133. See Strang, supra note 120, at 49–54 (describing the scholarship on this point).  
 134. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (explaining the 
ubiquity of easy cases).  
 135. It is often the case that when the law is epistemically determinate it still takes 
significant work to ascertain the law’s determinate content. In my own practice experience, for 
instance, there was a considerable subset of cases where, to arrive at the conclusion that the law 
was determinate and to learn the law’s content, I had recourse to a significant body of legal 
materials. I labored over statutes, administrative regulations, cases interpreting and applying 
both, and background constitutional and common law norms. My experience—that the law 
can be epistemically determinate and yet that it may take great effort to arrive at that 
conclusion—is supported by the work of many scholars. Dworkin’s Hercules, though 
possessing greater time, research skill, and judgment than myself, utilized the same mode of 
inquiry to ascertain the law’s determinate content. DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 105–06.  
 136. Id. at 279–90 (defending the thesis that, even in hard cases, there can be “one right 
answer”).  
 137. This obstacle to legal determinacy is significantly lessened as access to historical 
materials has become easier and with the advent of computer assisted historical searches. The 
Commerce Clause’s original meaning provides a good example of this phenomenon. In 1937, 
access to the Clause’s original meaning was more limited, and the only means to synthesize the 
Clause’s original meaning was unaided human effort. Today, by contrast, there are numerous 
electronic resources that store the historical record, and computers assist in synthesizing 
original meaning. Randy Barnett’s research into the Clause exemplifies these advances. See 
Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 847, 856 & n.32, 857 & n.35, 858–62 (2003) (describing his methodology of using 
computer assisted searches of electronically available historical sources). Consequently, the 
amount of epistemic indeterminacy is less today than in the past and is likely to decrease 
further.  
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one limitation—unlimited time to devote to ascertaining the law’s 
content.138  
A second reason is that law is a practical endeavor. Unlike 
intellectual investigations that require theoretical reason, the goal of 
which is certainty, practical inquiries often do not offer certainty.139 
Instead, using practical reason, the goal is to determine which course 
of action is most likely correct. This is a consequence of the subject 
matter of practical reason: the thick, fact-laden, contingent occasions 
of human activity.140  
These concrete situations of human activity pose at least two 
analytically distinct questions: (1) What ethical (or legal) norms are 
pertinent to—potentially govern—this case?; and (2) What course of 
conduct does the governing norm prescribe? Answering both 
questions can potentially, depending on the subject, place 
tremendous burdens on the judgment of the decision maker.  
Analogizing to the realm of ethics, some questions are relatively 
simple: one who borrows a knife from one’s neighbor to cut 
vegetables must return it.141 Determining the correct course of 
conduct presented by this case is relatively straight forward because 
both the governing ethical norm and the manner by which that 
norm governs this case are relatively clear. The governing norm is 
“one must return borrowed items to their owners,” and the 
hypothetical presented a paradigm example142 of that norm.  
However, the thicker one makes the hypothetical by adding new 
circumstances, the more difficult both analyses become, and quickly 
 
 138. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 105 (describing Hercules’ lack of human 
limitations).  
 139. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 
75, at bk. II, ch. 9, 1109b19–23 (“But up to what point and to what extent a man must 
deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more 
than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and 
the decision rests with perception.”).  
 140. See Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1998) 
(describing and defending casuistry as a mechanism to answer practical questions).  
 141. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2409 (1994) (“[A]ny form of . . . 
keeping the property of others is against the seventh commandment . . . [including] deliberate 
retention of goods lent . . . .”); I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 66, art. 8 (stating that the 
unconcealed taking of another’s property without the owner’s consent is robbery, which is 
contrary to justice).   
 142. See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY 251–52 
(1988) (describing the concept of “paradigm cases” in the casuist tradition); Richard B. Miller, 
Narrative and Casuistry: A Response to John Arras, 69 IND. L.J. 1015, 1017 (1993) (same); see 
also RUBENFELD, supra note 60, at 178–95 (describing a similar concept).  
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so. Continuing the previous hypothetical, assume that the neighbor 
has a violent temper,143 and that he has been arguing with another 
neighbor.144 It is now unclear whether the norm of returning 
borrowed items governs, or whether another norm, such as “protect 
innocent human life,” applies.145 Further, it is unclear the manner by 
which one or both of these norms applies to the case.  
Returning to the realm of law, and specifically to constitutional 
interpretation, a similar phenomenon obtains because of law’s 
practical orientation. Both the articulation of the Constitution’s 
original meaning and how it governs a particular case will be more or 
less difficult depending on the subject. As in ethics, it is sometimes 
clear what the governing original meaning norm is and how it 
governs a particular case. For example, the original meaning of the 
Commerce Clause is fairly clear,146 and its prescription in the case of 
whether Congress can regulate the transportation by rail of 
commercial goods from New York to Illinois is also relatively clear.147 
In many other situations, however, things are less clear. And, of 
course, one of the processes—articulating the original meaning or 
applying that norm—may be clear while the other is less so.  
The Interpretative Approach operates when the Constitution’s 
original meaning is metaphysically and epistemically determinate. In 
these cases, an originalist precedent will articulate the determinate 
original meaning that governs the legal questions raised by the case. 
The Interpretive Approach functions most importantly when the law 
is epistemically determinate and the case is difficult.  
The Interpretative Approach operates as well when the 
Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically determinate but 
epistemically indeterminate.148 This is because the Constitution’s 
 
 143. The neighbor lacks the virtue of temperance. See JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR 
CARDINAL VIRTUES 145–206 (1966) (describing the virtue of temperance).  
 144. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142, at 324–25 (giving this hypothetical).  
 145. Id. at 325 (“[T]he question is what relative weight one should allow the two 
relevant considerations—the obligation to return a borrowed gun, and the duty to avoid being 
a party to violence or homicide.”). 
 146. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 313 (describing the original meaning as: “to specify 
how a rightful activity may be transacted . . . and the power to prohibit wrongful acts” in “the 
trade or exchange of goods[,] including the means of transporting them . . . between persons 
of one state and another”). 
 147. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (describing Congress’ power 
to regulate the instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce).  
 148. See Barnett Response, supra note 5, at 1235 (stating that precedent “can provide 
epistemic guidance in the face of uncertain original meaning”).  
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meaning is determinate so that, in principle, there is a right answer. 
There are obstacles to accessing that right answer which may or may 
not be permanent. If or when those obstacles are removed—for 
example, new research techniques permit greater access to the 
original meaning—then the law would cease to be epistemically 
indeterminate.  
A possible example of this phenomenon is the Second 
Amendment. The Amendment’s original meaning is metaphysically 
determinate on the point of an individual right to keep and bear 
arms.149 From the perspective of judges, prior to the early-1980s, 
there was little readily available evidence of the Second 
Amendment’s original meaning. At this point, then, the Second 
Amendment’s original meaning was metaphysically determinate and 
epistemically indeterminate. Then, beginning with Don Kates’ 
famous 1983 article, Handgun Prohibition and the Original 
Meaning of the Second Amendment,150 a wealth of scholarship 
explored the Amendment’s original meaning. This opened the 
evidentiary door to the Amendment’s original meaning and made 
what was once epistemically indeterminate, determinate.  
By contrast, the Interpretative Approach does not operate when 
the Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically and 
epistemically indeterminate. Instead, the Constructive Approach 
applies, and later judges will give deference to originalist precedents 
that construct constitutional meaning. In these cases, the original 
meaning does not answer the question, and so the Court must create 
an answer. In doing so, the Court creates constitutional meaning.  
E. The Presumption in Favor of Originalist Precedent and Precedential 
Drift 
I noted above that originalist precedent under both the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches is protected by a 
rebuttable presumption. The presumption arises when a precedent 
meets the OGF standard. This presumption gives originalist 
 
 149. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under Fire: The New Consensus on the 
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996) (“Research conducted through the 
1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes reluctantly, but with virtual 
unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual 
right view of the Second Amendment.”).  
 150. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983).  
DO NOT DELETE 2/1/2011 7:15 PM 
1729 An Originalist Theory of Precedent 
 1763 
precedent its privileged place in constitutional adjudication. The 
presumption protects originalist precedent from subsequent scrutiny 
and challenge. Consequently, it ensures that originalist precedent 
receives the constitutionally mandated “significant respect.”  
One possible challenge to my theory of originalist precedent is 
that it will result in what I call precedential drift. Precedential drift 
occurs when, over time, precedent builds upon itself, with the result 
that the operative legal meaning of the Constitution, as articulated 
by the precedent, diverges from the Constitution’s original meaning.  
A possible instance of precedential drift occurred in the Supreme 
Court’s Commerce Clause case law in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.151 During this period, most Supreme Court 
Commerce Clause precedent met the standard of OGF. For example, 
in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., the Court ruled that Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power did not extend to manufacturing.152 The 
Supreme Court there applied the Clause’s original meaning.153 Yet, 
as detailed by Professor Richard Epstein, the Court’s precedent 
slowly expanded the operative legal meaning of what Congress could 
regulate.154 
The primary check on precedential drift is the rebuttability of the 
presumption protecting originalist precedent. Litigants, scholars, and 
judges may rebut the presumption by showing either that: (1) there 
is not substantial evidence that the originalist precedent in question 
correctly articulated the original meaning; and/or (2) there is not 
substantial evidence that the precedent correctly applied that 
meaning.155 The presumption is low enough that litigants, scholars, 
or judges can effectively challenge precedents.156 This prevents 
precedential drift and preserves the primacy of the Constitution’s 
original meaning.157 
 
 151. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1408–42 (1987) (detailing this evolution).  
 152. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (arguing that 
“[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it”).  
 153. Epstein, supra note 151, at 1408–42.   
 154. Id.  
 155. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 156. The presumption in favor of originalist precedent is not as powerful as that 
identified by Professor Caleb Nelson, “demonstrably erroneous.” Nelson, supra note 98. My 
substantial evidence standard permits more frequent rebuttal of the presumption than that 
proposed by Professor Nelson.  
 157. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
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F. Summary of the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches 
The conception of originalist precedent put forward in this 
Article fits and draws support from the distinctions between 
constitutional interpretation and construction, and between 
metaphysical and epistemic determinacy.158 Judges should utilize the 
Interpretative Approach toward originalist precedent when the 
precedent in question is interpreting the Constitution’s original 
meaning. This occurs when the original meaning is metaphysically 
and epistemically determinate. Judges should also apply the 
Interpretative Approach when the original meaning is metaphysically 
determinate and epistemically indeterminate.  
In both of these situations, originalist precedent is playing an 
epistemic role by articulating, in good faith, the Constitution’s 
original meaning and, in good faith, applying that meaning to the 
facts presented by a case. It is not creating meaning. Rather, the 
precedent is putting into practice the original meaning. 
As I describe concretely in Part VI, below, these precedents 
provide evidence of how the original meaning controls concrete 
situations. Originalist precedents subject to the Interpretative 
Approach show how the gap between the Constitution’s 
authoritative meaning and the conduct it governs is bridged. 
Judges should apply the Constructive Approach, by contrast, 
when the precedent in question is constructing constitutional 
meaning. This occurs when the Constitution’s original meaning is 
metaphysically indeterminate. Here, originalist precedent is playing 
the metaphysical role of creating constitutional law and then 
applying those norms to the facts of the case.  
Originalist precedent subject to the Interpretative Approach 
explains the Constitution’s resolution of particular issues presented 
 
 158. My Interpretative and Constructive Approaches to originalist precedent parallel the 
distinction articulated by Professor Paul Horwitz between epistemic and legal deference. Paul 
Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2008). Epistemic 
deference, as described by Horwitz, is deference to another because of its greater insight into 
the truth of the matter. Id. at 1061. This fits my Interpretative Approach where a later 
Supreme Court will defer to an earlier Court’s determination embodied in an originalist 
precedent. Horwitz describes legal deference as deference to another because of the authority’s 
legal standing. Id. This fits my Constructive Approach where originalist precedent subject to 
the Constructive Approach receives deference, in part, simply because it is the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of the case. Professor Gary Lawson has made a distinction similar to Horwitz’s. Gary 
Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from Dr. Seuss, 24 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 381, 384–86 (2001).  
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in cases. It does so by specifying how the Constitution resolves 
discrete legal questions, by making implicit constitutional norms 
explicit, by resolving perceived tensions in the Constitution’s 
meaning, and by embedding these resolutions in precedent. These 
resolutions, preserved in originalist precedent, embody the 
authoritative norms that govern social activity in the class of 
situations analogous to the originalist precedent. Giving originalist 
precedent significant respect preserves these accomplishments and 
avoids leaving all questions open to re-evaluation. 
Originalist precedent subject to the Constructive Approach crafts 
legal norms that resolve particular issues presented in cases. These 
constructed constitutional norms coordinate social activity. Giving 
the constructions embodied in originalist precedent significant 
respect protects the work done by the prior court in constructing the 
norms, and it prevents continual attack on the precedential 
resolution of issues.  
G. The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches Meet Article III’s 
Mandate 
My theory of originalist precedent is truly originalist because it 
comports with Article III’s requirement that federal judges give 
precedent “significant respect.” Here, I tie Article III’s mandate to 
the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches. In doing so, I 
resolve the quandary of how judges can be faithful to the 
Constitution’s original meaning and, at the same time, follow 
precedent.  
First, utilizing the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches is 
faithful to the Constitution’s determinate original meaning. These 
approaches give the original meaning pride-of-place by aspiring to 
accurately articulate and apply the original meaning. As a practical 
matter, judges who in good faith strive to articulate and apply the 
Constitution’s original meaning will regularly succeed. Further, since 
originalist precedent receives only a presumption of bindingness, 
good faith mistakes will be corrected.  
Second, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches require 
judges to follow precedent and, consequently, Article III’s 
requirement. I have argued that when federal judges give originalist 
precedent significant respect, they preserve the interpretative and 
constructive work done by those precedents. Regarding originalist 
precedent subject to the Interpretative Approach, giving those 
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precedents significant respect ensures that they perform their 
evidentiary work of articulating the Constitution’s original meaning 
and explaining how that meaning governs particular fact patterns. 
For originalist precedent subject to the Constructive Approach, 
significant respect preserves their creative articulation and application 
of constitutional meaning.  
Another way of looking at my resolution of the quandary is that 
my explanation of the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches 
shows why Article III’s command that federal judges give precedent 
significant respect makes sense. One could argue that, in every case, 
the originalist judge should retire to the original meaning and skip 
any pertinent precedent; the critic could say that the originalist 
precedent is adding nothing to the judge’s analysis.  
In response, my conception of originalist precedent shows that 
originalist precedent has two important roles: evidentiary and 
creative. I have also argued that these roles are effectuated by 
according originalist precedent a presumption of correctness. 
Therefore, the originalist judge acts intelligently when he utilizes 
originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication.  
H. Conclusion 
Below, in Part VI, I explain the concrete ways my conception of 
originalist precedent operates. Then, in Part VII, I conclude that the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches are more normatively 
attractive than alternative conceptions of originalist precedent.  
VI. PUTTING INTO PRACTICE THE CONSTITUTION’S ORIGINAL 
MEANING 
A. Introduction 
In this Part, I explain the ways in which the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches operate in practice. Section B discusses the 
roles of originalist precedent in the context of constitutional 
interpretation. Here, originalist precedent does not alter the 
Constitution’s meaning and the Interpretative Approach applies. 
Originalist precedent provides evidence of how the original meaning 
is connected to and governs the activity under its purview. It bridges 
the distance between the original meaning and the human activity 
subject to the Constitution’s governance.  
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Section C covers constitutional construction. Originalist 
precedent in this context, in many cases, determines the 
Constitution’s meaning, so the Constructive Approach governs. 
These originalist precedents create the governing constitutional 
norm. When the Constructive Approach applies, unlike when the 
Interpretative Approach applies, the originalist precedent does more 
than simply provide evidence of the Constitution’s meaning: it 
constructs that meaning. In some other cases of constitutional 
construction, however, the Interpretative Approach continues to 
apply. I will explain when and why.  
B. Constitutional Interpretation 
1. Specifying the Constitution’s original meaning 
By specification I mean answering a practical—here, legal—
question in the context of a concrete—here, legal—case. 
Specification makes explicit how the Constitution’s original meaning 
resolves a particular legal question. It identifies the relevant 
constitutional norms and determines how those norms order human 
actions. This is the primary practical role of originalist precedent. 
Most originalist precedent fulfills this function.  
Originalists argue that judges should enforce the original 
meaning of the Constitution’s text, but it is an exceedingly rare case, 
especially today, that turns on the simple application of the original 
meaning (or, more precisely, the principle, standard, or rule, 
embodied in the text’s original meaning) to the facts presented in a 
case. Instead, federal courts have, from their inception, articulated 
legal norms that specify159 the result in constitutional cases, thereby 
reducing or eliminating the need for direct appeals to constitutional 
text.  
Specification is the process by which courts create constitutional 
law. The creation of constitutional law and doctrine through the 
process of specification is entirely legitimate—indeed, it is a necessary 
 
 159. I use the term “specify” to distinguish the activity of courts when they create 
constitutional law or doctrine from what Professor Richard Fallon labels “implementing” the 
Constitution, which is a broader term that, in addition, covers the creative activity of courts 
when they put the Constitution into practical effect. See FALLON, supra note 7, at 5–7, 41–42 
(describing implementation and distinguishing it from specification); see also Fallon, supra note 
18, at 1283 (distinguishing specification from implementation).  
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component of constitutional adjudication.160 A case before a court 
presents a set of factual circumstances that, if a constitutional case, 
implicates one or more provisions of the Constitution. The litigants 
in the constitutional case each argue that the purportedly applicable 
constitutional provision has a certain meaning, and they argue that 
application of that meaning to the factual circumstances of the case 
leads to them prevailing.  
After entertaining these arguments, the court first determines the 
constitutional provision’s original meaning. Second, the court applies 
that meaning to the case and determines which litigant’s argument 
prevails. Through this two-step process the court specifies that in 
factual situations analogous to that presented by the case, a particular 
result obtains. In doing so, the court announces a rule, standard, or 
principle, thereby creating constitutional law. That rule, standard, or 
principle guides future courts’ determinations of future, analogous, 
constitutional cases. The constitutional law thereby created can come 
in the form of constitutional law doctrines, tests, and formulas with 
which lawyers are familiar.161 
By itself, the Constitution is a “sparse collection of general 
terms” that often lacks the specificity to govern a nation, especially a 
complex, dynamic nation such as our own.162 Terms like 
“Commerce,”163 are not self-applying, and much less are phrases like 
“executive Power”164 or “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”165 
The process of specification takes the meaning of the Constitution’s 
general terms and phrases and creates constitutional law capable of 
meeting society’s need for coordination. The more particularized 
norms of constitutional law created through adjudication and found 
in cases have the specificity to connect the meaning of constitutional 
terms to practical situations.166 And these norms have the 
determinacy to guide the conduct of society’s members to a much 
 
 160. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 1281 (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning is 
frequently not an effective means of implementing the Constitution).  
 161. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 6 (arguing that before the Constitution can 
“impose[] obligations on the judge that are reflected in the vindication of the legal 
entitlements of one party or another . . . it must be elaborated as a series of doctrines, 
formulas, or tests”). 
 162. Id.  
 163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 164. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
 165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  
 166. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 6.  
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greater degree than the constitutional text standing alone.167 Many 
originalists have hinted at the need to articulate the process of 
specification,168 but this is its first articulation.  
The process of specification I have described is not unique to 
law. Philosophy, and in particular ethics, has grappled with an 
analogous situation since at least the time of Socrates.169 The fact 
that most philosophical traditions in the field of ethics have 
articulated means to specify how ethical norms decide concrete cases 
suggests that specification in law is likewise possible.170  
In the realm of practical ethics, philosophers have struggled to 
articulate how human conduct can be guided by norms—by 
reasons171—that are, by definition, more general than the specific 
conduct they are supposed to guide. For example, one commonly 
accepted norm of human conduct is “do not steal.”172 The manner 
by which that norm guides specific human actions, however, is not 
always clear. In the property law context, there is a veritable cottage 
industry of philosophical arguments why—or why not—this norm 
applies to persons who use another’s property in cases of necessity.173 
Strong arguments have been advanced on both sides,174 indicating 
 
 167. Id.  
 168. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 5, at 327 (“[I]t is certainly the case that many parts of 
our constitutional text are worded at a high level of generality and the caselaw construing the 
text is thus of critical importance.”).  
 169. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142 (describing the history of how the West 
has attempted to resolve concrete ethical dilemmas); see also Miller, supra note 142, at 1015 
(describing some of the methods used by casuists to reduce ethical uncertainty).  
 170. My claims in this section, including my analogy to ethics and particularly to the 
Aristotelian tradition, show that I do not accept claims that the truth of constitutional meaning 
is only found in its operation. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of 
Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173 
(2006) (giving a pragmatic view of precedent).  
 171. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 102–05 (1999) (describing 
human action as reason-governed).  
 172. Exodus 20:15 (“Thou shalt not steal.”).  
 173. The doctrine of necessity is where one is privileged to use another’s property 
because of the need to protect one’s or another’s person or property. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 195 (1965).  
 174. See, e.g., II-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 66, art. 7 (“In cases of need, all things 
are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another’s property for 
need has made it common.”); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, at XI.4 
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (following Aquinas’ position); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law 
and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 113 (1978) (offering a law and economics justification for 
the doctrine of necessity).  
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that application of the general norm—do not steal—to some 
situations—those of necessity—is a challenging process. 
Philosophers have articulated a number of means to apply 
practical norms to particularized instances of human conduct.175 
These include, for instance, creating a practical syllogism with the 
general norm as the major premise, the specific conduct in question 
as the minor premise, and the conclusion giving the appropriate 
course of ethical conduct.176 Another method is balancing competing 
reasons for and against action to determine which are of greatest 
import, and acting accordingly.177 There are other methods,178 and 
the existence, scope, and distinctiveness of each of these methods is 
contested by philosophers.179 Regardless of the method used, 
however, the philosophical consensus is that practical norms can and 
do guide concrete human action.180  
In law, judges face the same issue: how norms that are more 
abstract than the facts presented by a case specify the correct—
legal—course of conduct of the parties in the case. The fact that 
specification occurs in ethics is a powerful reason to believe that it 
also occurs in law. We should not be surprised, therefore, by the 
numerous aspects of our legal practice which indicate that 
specification occurs in law in manners similar to ethics.181  
In fully developed systems of ethics, the appropriate methods of 
specification are identified, numerous intermediate norms are 
articulated,182 and proper resolutions to frequent practical questions 
 
 175. See John D. Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 
IND. L.J. 983, 985–88 (1994) (describing different mechanisms of ethical specification).  
 176. ARISTOTLE, supra note 139, at bk. VI, ch. 12, 1144a; ARISTOTLE, De Anima, in 
THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. III, ch. 11, at 434a16–22 (Richard McKeon ed., J.A. 
Smith trans., Random House 1941) (c. 384 B.C.).   
 177. W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).  
 178. Reasoning by analogy is a commonly identified third method of specifying the 
correct course of conduct.  
 179. See Henry S. Richardson, Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical 
Problems, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 279, 284–90 (1990) (describing the disputes). Richardson’s 
piece is the classic article on specification. He defines specification on pages 295–96.  
 180. See David DeGrazia, Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases, and 
Specified Principlism, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 511 (1992) (describing specification).  
 181. Tremblay, supra note 140, at 518.  
 182. See id. at 503–07 (describing “principlism” which is the use of generally agreed-
upon ethical principles as starting points of ethical judgment).  
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are recognized.183 For instance, in the Aristotelian philosophical 
tradition,184 significant emphasis is placed on the faculty of the 
human mind known as practical reason, which enables one to specify 
how one should act in a given context.185 In law, similarly, scholars 
across the ideological spectrum have recognized the faculty that 
enables some judges to achieve excellence in adjudication. Examples 
include the legal realist Karl Llewellyn’s “situation sense,”186 and 
natural lawyer Gerard Bradley’s “legal reason[].”187 
Over the years, the Aristotelian tradition also has recognized a 
wide array of intermediate norms. Intermediate norms are lower-
level, more concrete instantiations of higher-level, more general 
ethical principles.188 Intermediate norms are one mechanism used in 
the Aristotelian tradition to bridge the decisional space between 
general ethical norms and particular practical situations.189 
Intermediate norms can themselves be relatively abstract, such as the 
prohibition on taking innocent human life,190 which is derived from 
the more abstract natural law norm of doing good and avoiding evil, 
or relatively concrete such as the norm permitting killing uniformed 
 
 183. See Miller, supra note 142, at 1015 (stating that casuistry arose to overcome the 
ethical uncertainty occasioned by the “uncertainty about the meaning or applicability of a 
moral principle”).   
 184. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 58–148 (1990) (describing the origin and 
emergence of the tradition); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES 
AND PUBLIC MORALITY 19–35 (1993) (describing what he labels the “central tradition”); see 
also Strang, supra note 25, at 916–36 (describing the tenets of the Aristotelian tradition).  
 185. I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 57, a. 4 (“[P]rudence is the right reason of things 
to be done.”); see also Tremblay supra note 140, at 521–22 (describing practical reason); R. 
Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ (2008) (same).  
 186. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60 
(1960).  
 187. Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of 
Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 251 (1991).  
 188. See GEORGE, supra note 171, at 52 (describing “intermediate moral principles” that 
“occupy a place between the very abstract first principle and the most concrete and specific 
moral injunctions”).   
 189. See Richardson, supra note 179, at 298 (“A mid-level norm that specifies a general 
one and thereby helps mediate the latter to a concrete case serves as a bridge.”).  
 190. See Exodus 23: 7 (“The innocent and the just person thou shall not put to death.”); 
see also I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 100, a. 1 (“For there are certain things which the 
natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be 
done: e.g., . . . Thou shalt not kill.”); id. Q. 94, a. 2 (“[E]very substance seeks the preservation 
of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means 
of preserving human life . . . belongs to the natural law.”).  
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enemy soldiers in a just war, which is itself a further specification of 
the two more abstract norms just discussed.191  
Through this articulation of intermediate norms, the tradition is 
better able to guide practical conduct. For instance, soldiers have the 
far easier task of judging whether the war in which they are fighting 
is just, using the criteria set forth in the Just War Tradition, and 
whether their opponents are uniformed enemy soldiers, than 
whether they are “doing good and avoiding evil.”  
The same three phenomena of identifying the appropriate 
methods of specification, articulating numerous intermediate norms, 
and recognizing resolutions to frequently-raised questions, has 
occurred in our legal practice. Precedent has been the primary 
mechanism of doing so. It is through originalist precedent that the 
Supreme Court applies the general norms of the Constitution’s 
original meaning192. Through precedent, the Court specifies how the 
Constitution’s original meaning governs human conduct.  
A commonly recognized facet of precedent is that the Court will 
frequently articulate an intermediate legal norm. Intermediate legal 
norms serve the same primary purpose as intermediate ethical norms. 
They bridge the space between the relatively abstract constitutional 
norms embodied in the Constitution’s original meaning and the 
practical legal questions presented in cases. Legal officials, such as 
lower court judges and executive officials, and citizens have less of a 
burden on their judgment—and are more likely to make the right 
legal judgment—if they have intermediate legal norms to guide their 
conduct. The Court’s criminal procedure case law, and more 
specifically the cases applying the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
on unreasonable searches and seizures, provides an important 
example of this.  
Our legal practice has also resolved frequently-raised questions. 
These resolutions, because they are deeply embedded in precedent 
 
 191. See CATECHISM, supra note 141, § 2309 (providing the “traditional elements” of 
the Just War Tradition). For a thorough review of the Tradition see GEORGE WEIGEL, 
TRANQUILLITAS ORDINIS: THE PRESENT FAILURE AND FUTURE PROMISE OF AMERICAN 
CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON WAR AND PEACE (1987). 
 192. I do not mean that the Constitution’s original meaning is always or even frequently 
abstract. Instead, I am claiming only that its original meaning is relatively more abstract than 
the cases it governs. From my own historical research into the original meaning of different 
constitutional provisions, my tentative conclusion is that the Constitution’s original meaning is 
rarely abstract and instead consists most often of relatively concrete rules and norms of 
intermediate generality.  
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and practice, put off-limits the resolutions to these questions. One 
such seminal resolution occurred during the Marshall Court. In two 
cases, the Court resolved the issue of whether, and to what extent, 
the Supreme Court could review state court judgments under Article 
III. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court specified that its Article 
III “judicial Power” over “Cases” included appeals from state court 
civil suits.193 Five years later, in Cohens v. Virginia, the Court 
specified that its “judicial Power” extended to state criminal 
appeals.194 The Court’s resolutions in Martin and Cohens are 
unchallengeable and have effectively specified the Constitution’s 
meaning in this context.  
In addition to ethics, everyday life also provides examples of 
specification at work. Imagine that you are the parent in a family 
with five children whose ages range from eleven to three. Assume 
further that in your household there have been no written statements 
regarding how you will treat your children. Instead, like in most 
families, the norms you follow in parenting your children are 
unwritten and rooted in religious, ethical, cultural, social, and 
traditional norms.  
One of the frequent areas of dispute between you and your 
children is over the subject of going to their friends’ houses. The 
sources of dispute are: (1) the times at which your children wish to 
play at their friends’ houses; (2) the proximity (or lack thereof) of 
their friends’ houses to your home; (3) the activities that will take 
place at their friends’ houses; (4) the age and maturity of your child; 
(5) the suitability of the friend as a friend of your child; and (6) the 
suitability of the friend’s home environment for your child. Your 
practice has been to balance these and other factors when one of 
your children makes a request to play at a friend’s house. You 
balance these factors with the purpose of maximizing your child’s 
growth toward virtue.  
Unfortunately for you, your children have agitated for reform in 
your household for many reasons, including because they believe 
that you have arbitrarily applied the factors listed above. In 
particular, your children believe that you are too concerned with the 
time they visit friends, and are too hostile to them playing electronic 
games at their friends’ houses.  
 
 193. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).  
 194. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).  
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To restore household accord, you take the step of holding a 
family meeting.195 You and your children agree to follow a norm 
governing their play at their friends’ houses. The norm is short and 
uses non-technical language. It states: “Children may play at their 
friends’ houses subject to reasonable regulation in the child’s best 
interest.”  
After agreeing to the norm, the daily process of requests by your 
children to play at their friends’ houses resumes. Your seven-year-
old, Alexander, asks to play at Justin’s house. You say yes, in part 
because your child is older than six. This process continues for some 
time. Children request to play at their friends’ houses and you apply 
the norm. In each instance, you bridge the space between the norm 
and the specific facts that it governs in the form of your children’s 
requests. In doing so, you specify how the norm determines these 
various requests.  
Next, your nine-year-old, Lucy, asks to play at Felicity’s house. 
As parents will attest, one of the sources of data upon which to 
decide whether to permit Lucy to play at Felicity’s house is your 
prior decisions. Your prior applications of the norm provide evidence 
of how the norm governs the current request.  
You say no to Lucy because the factors of time and proximity 
weigh heavily against playing at Felicity’s even though Lucy is older 
than six. Lucy appeals to the norm. Even though the norm is 
formally the provision governing this situation, she does not focus 
on parsing its meaning. Instead, Lucy argues that she is older than 
your seven-year-old, Alexander, who you permitted to play at 
Justin’s. Lucy also marshals other “cases” to show that, like her 
siblings in those cases, you should permit her to go to Felicity’s 
house.  
Lucy is taking the tact of many children: use analogous prior 
applications of the norm to her siblings as evidence of the norm’s 
meaning in her situation. She argues that, properly specified, the 
norm permits her to play at Felicity’s house. The affinity of this 
hypothetical to reality shows that, in everyday family life, 
specification is used to resolve concrete disputes governed by 
previously established norms.  
 
 195. See FRANK B. GILBRETH, JR., & ERNESTINE GILBRETH CAREY, CHEAPER BY THE 
DOZEN 37 (1949) (describing how the Gilbreth children agitated for reform of family 
governance which led to a family council).  
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The Interpretative Approach, to summarize, describes the 
evidentiary role that originalist precedent plays in a fully-developed 
originalism. Originalist precedent, as in ethics and everyday life, 
explicates how concrete cases are governed by the original 
meaning.196 Originalist precedent is the “data” repository for later 
courts looking to decide analogous concrete cases. Preserving the 
work done by originalist precedent is why Article III requires federal 
judges to give significant respect to constitutional precedent.197 
Originalist constitutional precedent creates constitutional law that 
federal courts will use in future adjudications. If the constitutional 
law created through the process of specification is a faithful 
ascertainment and application of the Constitution’s original 
meaning, then later courts should work within that constitutional 
law to decide future cases.  
With some constitutional texts, the need for constitutional law is 
clearer than in others.198 For instance, the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures.199 Assuming that the 
Search and Seizure Clause is a prohibition on unreasonable 
government action, the Court must create constitutional law to 
specify how the Clause’s original meaning applies to different 
concrete circumstances. The constitutional doctrines the Court 
articulates will be applications of the Clause’s principle of 
reasonableness to these concrete circumstances.  
For instance, the Court announced, in the context of passenger 
automobile stops for traffic violations, that a police officer “may 
order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the 
 
 196. See Richardson, supra note 179, at 297 (describing how specified norms are true 
specifications of the more general norms).  
 197. I defend this proposition in Part V.G supra; see also Strang, supra note 5 (providing 
an extended defense of this proposition).  
 198. The Search and Seizure Clause was drawn from Article XIV of the Massachusetts’ 
Declaration of Rights, drafted by John Adams, who in turn drew from the Pennsylvania 
constitution. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 170–71, 176–77 (1999). 
The Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause was relatively novel—and hence its 
original meaning is relatively hard to discern—because the Fourth Amendment was primarily 
the culmination of American efforts to eliminate general warrants. Id. at 150–79. There are, 
broadly speaking, two views on the original meaning of the Search and Seizure Clause: (1) the 
Clause is an independent prohibition on unreasonable government action; and (2) the Clause 
was a “statement of political moral principle . . . an explanation or justification for the Warrant 
Clause.” THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 324 (Edwin Meese, III et al., eds., 
2005).  
 199. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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[traffic] stop.”200 In Maryland v. Wilson, the Court applied the 
principle of reasonableness to the facts of the case and created a per 
se rule that would govern future analogous cases. In so doing, the 
Wilson Court relied on the earlier case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
which had ruled that police officers may order drivers of passenger 
cars to exit their vehicles on routine traffic stops.201 
Thus, the Mimms-Wilson line of cases has, through application of 
the Search and Seizure Clause’s reasonableness principle, created a 
rule of constitutional law. The Mimms-Wilson rule specifies how the 
principle of reasonableness applies in a given context, and the 
Court’s specification is authoritative in future cases with analogous 
factual circumstances. Litigants in such future cases will not, absent 
exceptional circumstances, make appeals directly to the Search and 
Seizure Clause and instead will craft arguments based on the Court’s 
precedent.  
However, with other constitutional texts, the necessity of the 
creation of constitutional law is less clear, but it remains nonetheless. 
The Article II, § 1, cl. 4 requirement that the President “shall . . . 
have attained to the age of thirty five years,” possibly the most 
concrete phrase in the Constitution, provides an example.202 The age 
requirement is often used by scholars as the most prominent counter 
to claims by critical legal scholars that the law is indeterminate.203 
The rule-ness of the age requirement itself precludes many questions 
that would otherwise result in litigation and consequently precludes 
the significant need for constitutional law that exists with other, less 
rule-like constitutional provisions.  
However, situations may still arise that call for specification of 
the Presidential Age Clause and the creation of constitutional law.204 
For instance, an underage plaintiff could advance the argument that 
 
 200. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).  
 201. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).  
 202. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. There are a couple of possible, compatible reasons for 
the age requirement: (1) to prevent the development of dynasties where the son of an 
illustrious father achieves the presidency on the father’s merits, AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 159–64 (2005); and (2) to help ensure sufficient maturity of 
presidents, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 758, at 540 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“That, which has been selected, 
is the middle age of life, by which period the character and talents of individuals are generally 
known, and fully developed.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 134, at 414, 420 (using this provision).   
 204. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265–66 (1990) 
(listing potential variations in the meaning of the age requirement).  
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the age requirement is more properly interpreted as a maturity 
requirement, and that he is sufficiently mature.205 An originalist 
judge faced with that argument would ascertain the original meaning 
of the age requirement and then apply that meaning to the facts 
presented by the case. In doing so, he could find that while Article 
II, § 1, cl. 4 has, as one of its goals, the maturity of the President, it 
uses the rule of thirty-five years of age instead of the standard of 
maturity to define the requirement for the office.206 The court would 
then announce a rule that the age requirement requires that the 
President be thirty-five years old. In doing so, the precedent would 
specify the Clause’s meaning.  
Alternatively, if the hypothetical plaintiff is correct and the 
original meaning of Article II, § 1, cl. 4 is a standard of maturity, 
then the court would issue a decision that would guide future courts 
in ascertaining whether a particular person meets the maturity 
standard in Article II, § 1, cl. 4. The decision would explain why the 
constitutional text prohibited or permitted the plaintiff to be 
President. Either way, the court would create constitutional law that 
specified the constitution’s original meaning and which would 
govern future adjudications.  
Today, of course, it is exceedingly rare for the Supreme Court to 
face an entirely new issue of constitutional law and hence the Court’s 
decisions are frequently decided on the basis of the Court’s 
constitutional law. This results from the process of specification that 
began with the first constitutional cases and the Court’s interpreting 
and applying the original meaning, thereby creating constitutional 
law. For example, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall 
relied on the nature of the judicial process to argue that, when faced 
with a statute that conflicts with the Constitution, a court must 
follow the Constitution.207 Marshall characterized the judicial process 
as “apply[ing] the rule to particular cases” which requires a judge to 
 
 205. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 
(1985) (making this argument); Girardeau Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 
MINN. L. REV. 473, 532–33 (1984) (same).  
  Or, he could advance the claim that the age requirement in Article II was 
subsequently altered by the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits irrational age discrimination. 
See Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The “Easy Case” of the Under-Aged President, 
84 NW. U. L. REV. 250, 255–56 (1989) (making this argument). 
 206. There is little scholarship on the original meaning of the age requirement, but what 
there is indicates that the age requirement is not susceptible of the maturity interpretation.  
 207. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
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“expound and interpret that rule.”208 The judicial process described 
by Marshall is one of specification. Judges determine the meaning of 
the Constitution, apply that meaning to the case at hand, and in 
doing so create constitutional law.  
The Interpretative Approach directs judges to give presumptive 
deference to originalist precedent that specifies constitutional 
meaning. This respects the originalist precedent’s good faith 
articulation and application of the original meaning, thereby 
preserving the epistemic work performed by the precedent.  
2. Bringing to light implicit constitutional norms 
Much of the Constitution’s original meaning is relatively patent; 
many of its norms are fairly obvious. To ascertain the original 
meaning in such cases does not require significant research or 
judgment. An example of such a patent originalist norm is the 
Coinage Clause, which authorizes Congress to “coin money.”209 It is 
clear that this provision’s original meaning grants Congress at least 
the authority to issue legal tender in the form of “metallic tokens.”210  
However, even when the Constitution’s original meaning is 
metaphysically and epistemically determinate, it often requires 
significant research and judgment to articulate that meaning. In 
these cases, the Constitution’s original meaning is implicit and 
originalist precedent makes explicit—brings to light—that original 
meaning.  
The Second Amendment’s protection of an individual right to 
keep and bear arms is an instance of this.211 It is not manifest that the 
Second Amendment’s original meaning protects an individual rather 
 
 208. Id.  
 209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.  
 210. See Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage 
Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1061 (2008) (“The more common meaning of 
‘coin’ in the eighteenth century, as now, referred to metallic tokens.”). For discussions on the 
original meaning of the Coinage Clause, see id. (arguing that the Clause’s original meaning 
included congressional authority to print paper money); Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender 
Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 389 (“[I]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
Framers intended to prohibit [the] use [of paper money].”); Claire Priest, Currency Policies 
and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303, 1398 n.358 (2001) 
(“It is uncontroversial that the Framers did not view the Constitution as giving Congress the 
power to issue paper money to be invested with the status of legal tender.”); Strang, supra 
note 5, at 475 (“There is a strong scholarly consensus that Congress was not authorized by 
this provision to issue paper money.”). 
 211. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
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than collective right. Indeed, it was not until the early-1980s that 
significant support for the individual right interpretation of the 
Amendment—labeled the Standard Model—arose.212 By the mid-
1990s, however, the Standard Model had become, as the label 
suggests, the consensus interpretation.213 Thereafter, the Supreme 
Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, in an originalist opinion,214 
made explicit the implicit original meaning of the Second 
Amendment by ruling that it protected an individual right.215 
This same phenomenon occurs in ethics. Returning again to the 
Aristotelian tradition, some ethical propositions are patent, while 
others are implicit.216 According to Aquinas, for instance, the first 
principle of natural law—do good and avoid evil217—is per se nota, or 
self-evident.218 There are a host of other natural law norms that are 
also manifest.219  
However, there are many implicit norms. These are norms the 
full explication of which took thought, argumentation, and time. For 
example, the Aristotelian tradition articulated the norm that it is 
“just to charge interest on a loan”220 after centuries of discussion.221 
 
 212. It is likely that the first modern scholarship to strongly support the Standard Model 
was Kates, supra note 149.  
 213. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 149, at 1141 (“Research conducted through the 
1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes reluctantly, but with virtual 
unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual 
right view of the Second Amendment.”).  
 214. See Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., 
June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is now called 
‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”).  
 215. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 216. See I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 94, art. 4 (“[T]he natural law, as to general 
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge.”).  
 217. Id., Q. 94, art. 2 (“Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”). 
 218. See id. (“[T]he precepts of the natural law are . . . self-evident principles.”); JOHN 
FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 126–29 (1998) (explaining 
another self-evident proposition of natural law, that “‘one should love one’s neighbor as 
oneself’”); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 29–32 (1980) (explaining the 
concept of self-evident propositions of natural law). 
 219. See I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 94, art. 2 (giving self-preservation, procreation, 
and practical reason as examples of self-evidently good goods).  
 220. 2 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 833 
(1993).  
 221. For a review of the history surrounding what constitutes usury see JOHN T. 
NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957); JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra 
note 142, at 181–94.  
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This norm was implicit in the tradition’s broader philosophical 
commitments.222 After significant thought, argumentation, and time, 
this ethical norm was made explicit in the tradition.223  
The Constitution’s original meaning will frequently not be 
apparent for a number of reasons. First, the data upon which to 
make a determination of what the original meaning is may be 
difficult to access or, if accessible, may present other obstacles such as 
an unmanageably large amount of data.224 Second, the factual 
situations that would provide an opportunity to make explicit the 
implicit norm may not have arisen or been presented. Third, the 
cultural, political, and economic environment may make the search 
for or articulation of implicit constitutional norms imprudent or not 
well received.225  
The Interpretative Approach directs judges to give originalist 
precedent that brings to light implicit constitutional norms 
presumptive respect. This respects the originalist precedent’s good 
faith articulation of the implicit original meaning norm, thereby 
preserving the precedent’s epistemic work.  
3. Resolving perceived tensions in the original meaning 
Originalist precedent resolves perceived tensions between 
constitutional norms by identifying, in a particular case, which of a 
stable of possibly governing norms in fact governs the outcome of 
the case.  
The norms embodied in the Constitution’s original meaning 
have focal cases.226 Given the care with which the Framers drafted 
 
 222. See FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 218, at 207 (stating that two principles supported 
charging reasonable interest: the cost to the lender of sharing the borrower’s risk, and the 
harm to the lender in the form of expenses and losses, including opportunity costs).  
 223. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142, at 193 (“Over five centuries there 
emerges a moral doctrine of precise definitions and distinctions, of narrowly limited solutions 
and well-reasoned arguments.”).  
 224. Although, as mentioned earlier, today’s more-readily accessible historical materials 
and computer assisted research tools have diminished these obstacles.  
 225. For example, for many years, and to a lesser though still significant degree today, the 
legal academy dismissed originalist arguments. Therefore, a scholar would lose standing in the 
academy if the scholar took originalist arguments seriously and sought to articulate the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  
 226. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 218, at 9–11 (describing the concept of 
focal cases). The focal case is the mechanism used to distinguish “the mature from the 
undeveloped in human affairs, the sophisticated from the primitive, the flourishing from the 
corrupt, the fine specimen from the deviate case, the ‘straightforwardly’, ‘simply speaking’ 
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the Constitution, it is unlikely that the focal cases of original 
meaning norms conflict. However, as one extends out from the focal 
case, it becomes more difficult to ascertain whether the norm 
governs a particular case. When aspects of two or more of the 
Constitution’s norms beyond their respective focal cases plausibly 
apply to the same matter, a perceived tension between the norms 
exists. Originalist precedent resolves that perceived tension.  
A famous instance of resolving perceived tensions was between 
the Bankruptcy Clause227 and the Contracts Clause,228 and the long-
standing state practice of bankruptcy and insolvency laws. On the 
one hand, the Bankruptcy Clause authorized Congress to establish 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,”229 and the Contracts 
Clause prohibited states from passing laws “impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts.”230 On the other hand, following adoption of the 
Constitution, states continued to pass bankruptcy and insolvency 
laws that applied to pre-existing debts.231 Many Americans before, 
during, and following Ratification of the Constitution, plausibly 
argued that the Bankruptcy and Contracts Clauses prohibited states 
from passing such legislation. 
The Supreme Court resolved the perceived tension in two cases: 
Sturges v. Crowninshield232 and Ogden v. Saunders.233 First, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Sturges Court ruled that states 
could not pass bankruptcy and insolvency laws that discharged pre-
existing debts.234 Later, in Ogden, the Court ruled that state 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws that discharged debts incurred after 
passage of the laws were constitutional.235  
The Court in both cases reviewed the text and history of the 
Clauses in a good faith articulation and application of the original 
 
(simpliciter), and ‘without qualification’ from the ‘in a sense’, ‘in a manner of speaking’, and 
‘in a way’ (secundum quid).” Id. at 10–11. For a description of the similar concept of paradigm 
cases see RUBENFELD, supra note 60, at 178–95.  
 227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
 228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  
 229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.   
 231. PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, 
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900, at 31–36 (1974). 
 232. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).  
 233. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).  
 234. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 197–208.  
 235. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 213.   
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meaning.236 Sturges and Ogden receive significant respect under the 
Interpretative Approach because they are evidence of how the 
Constitution’s original meaning is not in tension. This preserves the 
interpretative work performed by the Supreme Court.  
This same phenomenon of perceived tension occurs in ethics 
with ethical norms.237 In fact, one of the most powerful challenges to 
ethical theories is describing how to either avoid or resolve prima 
facie conflicts between ethical norms.238 Different philosophical 
traditions have arrived at different mechanisms to resolve perceived 
tensions between ethical norms. In the Aristotelian tradition, for 
instance, many perceived tensions that arise between natural law 
norms directing an individual toward integral human fulfillment are 
usually viewed as just that, perceived but not true conflicts. In other 
words, there is frequently a right answer to the ethical question.239  
Over time, the tradition has addressed many perceived tensions. 
One of the most profound tensions, one that has received sustained 
attention in the Aristotelian tradition, is that between the obligation 
to tell the truth and the obligation to avoid harming others that 
arises, for example, when one is asked to disclose information that 
will lead to the unjust treatment of another.240 More specifically, this 
occurs when an agent from an unjust regime asks a homeowner to 
disclose whether a fugitive is in the homeowner’s house. The 
homeowner knows that the fugitive is in the house and that, if that 
fact is disclosed, the regime will treat the fugitive unjustly.  
Members of the Aristotelian tradition, over centuries, focused on 
this perceived tension. Today, the tradition has concluded that the 
homeowner must not disclose the location of the fugitive.241 It 
thereby resolved the perceived tension. Members of that tradition 
give this conclusion—this resolution of the perceived tension—
significant respect.  
 
 236. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 197–207; Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 215.  
 237. See Miller, supra note 142, at 1015–16 (describing conflict between ethical norms).  
 238. See Arras, supra note 175, at 995–96 (describing the challenge to ethics posed by 
conflicting ethical principles); Richardson, supra note 179, at 284–90 (describing and 
criticizing the dominant methods of resolving concrete ethical problems).  
 239. See 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL 
PRINCIPLES 98 (reprint ed., 1997) (“[T]he created order of things embodies meanings and 
values placed there by a wise and loving creator.”).  
 240. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142, at 195–215 (describing the tradition’s 
grappling with the perceived conflict).  
 241. Id. at 213.  
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The Interpretative Approach directs judges to give presumptive 
respect to originalist precedent that resolves perceived tensions in the 
original meaning. This presumption respects the originalist 
precedent’s good faith articulation and application of the original 
meaning, and thereby preserves the precedent’s epistemic work.  
4. Embedding the Constitution’s original meaning 
Originalist precedent embeds the Constitution’s original 
meaning in the Supreme Court’s constitutional law. The process of 
embodying the original meaning in case law protects and defends 
that meaning.  
It does so in a number of ways. First, case law puts the Court’s 
institutional prestige behind the original meaning. The Court’s 
originalist precedent carries with it both the respect for the 
Constitution’s original meaning and the Court’s own, independent 
weight. Second, the original meaning is protected by the Court’s 
reasoned explanation of the reasons behind it.242 Frequently, in 
explaining itself in its opinion, the Court provides reasons why the 
result reached by the Court—in accordance with the original 
meaning—is substantively good.243 Articulating why the original 
meaning is good ensures wider support for it. The Court has also 
argued, on occasion, why, even though the original meaning is not 
ideal, it is better to follow that meaning rather than create a different 
meaning.244 
Embedding the Constitution’s original meaning in originalist 
precedent protects that meaning from alteration. This is valuable 
because the original meaning itself is valuable: it generally resolves 
coordination problems in a manner superior to judicial coordination, 
the most commonly proposed alternative.245 Embedding the original 
 
 242. See Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 17, at 882 
(noting the common practice by the Court of giving normative arguments in favor of its 
conclusion).  
 243. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–69 (2004) (arguing that the 
Confrontation Clause’s original meaning is superior to nonoriginalist interpretations); U.S. v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564–68 (1995) (arguing that limiting Congress to a Commerce Clause 
power more in line with the Clause’s original meaning would have the good effects of 
maintaining our federal system and preventing overcentralization).  
 244. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202–03 
(1989).  
 245. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1737–51 (2010) (arguing that “judicial updating” of the 
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meaning also advances Rule of Law values such as stability of the 
law.  
Embedding the Constitution’s original meaning is an important 
aspect of the Interpretative Approach. The embedded original 
meaning permits it to better perform its function of preserving the 
epistemic work accomplished by the precedent. 
C. Constitutional Construction 
1. Introduction 
This section describes how originalist precedent in the context of 
constitutional construction receives respect via both the Constructive 
and Interpretative Approaches. Originalist precedent in the context 
of constitutional construction plays the same roles as precedent in 
the context of constitutional interpretation. In addition, it also 
creates constitutional meaning which has gravitational effect on 
other areas of constructed constitutional law.  
2. Creating defeasible constitutional meaning 
The roles played by originalist precedent in the context of 
constitutional interpretation are also played by originalist precedent 
in constitutional construction: specifying constitutional meaning, 
bringing to light implicit constitutional norms, resolving perceived 
tensions in the original meaning, and embedding the Constitution’s 
original meaning. There are three significant differences, however. 
First, originalist precedent in the context of construction resolves 
original indeterminacy. Second, the constructed constitutional 
meaning is defeasible by the elected branches. Third, originalist 
precedent that constructs constitutional law has a gravitational effect 
on other areas of (constructed) constitutional law. I will address each 
difference, in turn.  
Constitutional construction occurs when the outcome of a case is 
indeterminate. It occurs in two fashions: first, when the 
Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically determinate but 
epistemically indeterminate; and second, when the Constitution’s 
 
Constitution leads to worse results than following the Constitution’s original meaning); see also 
Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 105 (1989) (describing the 
deepest flaw of nonoriginalist methodologies as “mak[ing] law the product not of mind, but of 
accident”).  
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original meaning is both metaphysically and epistemically 
indeterminate. In the former category, the Interpretative Approach 
applies; in the latter category, the Constructive Approach applies. I 
first explain why this is the case, and then I describe in more detail 
the unique aspects of the Constructive Approach. 
The Interpretative Approach applies to metaphysically 
determinate but epistemically indeterminate cases because, as I 
described more fully above,246 the Constitution’s original meaning is 
determinate. There is an obstacle—perhaps permanent, perhaps 
temporary—to the interpreter’s access to that determinate original 
meaning. Until such time as the metaphysically determinate original 
meaning is accessible, the originalist precedent will play the epistemic 
role of providing evidence of the original meaning and will receive 
significant respect for that reason. 
Originalist precedent governed by the Constructive Approach, 
by contrast, in addition to providing evidence of the Constitution’s 
(indeterminate) original meaning, also creates determinate—though 
defeasible—original meaning.247 These precedents are entitled to 
significant respect because they create the legal norm that 
coordinates social activity. Until a later Court determines that the 
originalist precedent should be overruled, it is the governing 
constitutional law.  
Second, the originalist precedent’s construction of constitutional 
law is, as I just suggested, defeasible. Though there is significant 
disagreement on this point,248 my tentative conclusion is that 
originalist precedent that constructs constitutional law is subject to 
defeasance by the elected branches.249 Therefore, if the Court at 
Time X constructed Meaning 1, and Congress passed a statute that is 
constitutional only under Meaning not-1, then Congress has 
reconstructed the Constitution’s meaning. So, in a case at Time Y 
 
 246. See supra Part IV.D.   
 247. See Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber 
and Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 1235 (acknowledging that precedent can “fix[]” the 
Constitution’s meaning, at least in the case of ambiguity).  
 248. See id. (stating that precedent that “resolve[s] latent ambiguities in the text by 
‘fixing’ its meaning” is not defeasible and instead is subject to change only via constitutional 
amendment).  
 249. I have elsewhere defended this position. See Strang, supra note 120, at 70–72 
(supporting this claim). I followed Keith Whittington on this point. See Whittington, supra 
note 25, at 11 (“The judiciary should not prop up old constructions that are no longer 
politically authoritative.”).  
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involving the constitutionality of the statute, the Court should adopt 
Meaning not-1 (so long as it is consistent with what is known about 
the original meaning). 
The third difference is the gravitational force of precedent 
subject to the Constructive Approach. Gravitational force is the 
power of cases and the legal principles they instantiate to influence 
the law around them, including later cases.250 Originalist precedent 
that constructs constitutional meaning is analogous to common law 
adjudication because, in both, the courts are creatively articulating 
law. In both, the law is that body of legal rules and principles that 
best fits and justifies the legal practice.251 The legal principles in both 
influence the law—exert gravitational force.  
Originalist precedents that do not construct constitutional law 
do not have gravitational force because they do not create the 
governing legal principles. Instead, the Constitution’s determinate 
original meaning provides those legal principles, and originalist 
precedent instantiates them.  
D. Preliminary Response to the “New Doctrinalists” 
I intend the conception of originalist precedent I offer here to be 
a partial252 response to the claims made by scholars known as the 
New Doctrinalists.253 The New Doctrinalists are a group of scholars 
who have revived focus on the Supreme Court’s legal doctrine.  
Two key points advanced by the New Doctrinalists are: (1) there 
is a distinction between propositions about the Constitution’s 
meaning and propositions implementing or putting into effect the 
Constitution’s meaning254; and (2) there is a permissible disparity 
 
 250. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 111–17 (describing gravitational force).  
 251. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 230–31, 254–58 (1986) (explaining his fit 
and justification conception of law).  
 252. In a future article, I hope to more directly address the New Doctrinalists’ claims.  
 253. The most prominent New Doctrinalists are Professors Mitchell Berman, Richard 
Fallon, and Kermit Roosevelt. Brannon Denning has taken the New Doctrinalists’ suggestions 
and applied them to the Dormant Commerce Clause in an insightful article. Brannon P. 
Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
417 (2008). For a critique of the New Doctrinalists see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 173 (2006).  
 254. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes 
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2005) (“[T]here is a distinction between 
the Constitution itself and the rules that courts apply in deciding cases.”).  
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between these two sorts of propositions.255 New Doctrinalist scholars 
argue that these two key points are not only an accurate description 
of our practice256; they claim that these points are necessary to any 
plausible theory of constitutional interpretation.257 
In this Article, I showed that originalism, with the Interpretative 
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent, preserves 
a significant place for constitutional doctrine. First, constitutional 
doctrine is expressed in originalist precedents, and then this doctrine, 
so long as the presumption in its favor remains unrebutted, governs 
later cases. In this way, originalism fits the descriptive claim of the 
New Doctrinalists that constitutional doctrine is a central facet of 
our legal practice. 
I also established that, at least in the context of constitutional 
interpretation, there is no disparity between the constitutional 
doctrine thus created and the Constitution’s governing original 
meaning. Instead, doctrine is the method of making express the 
Constitution’s meaning in particular contexts. There is a trivial 
disparity in the sense that the doctrine does not simply repeat the 
canonical form of the Constitution’s meaning. But that is true any 
time a practical norm is applied to concrete activity. The doctrine 
states that when such-and-such is the case, the governing 
constitutional meaning requires such-and-such an outcome. At least 
with issues of constitutional interpretation, therefore, the New 
Doctrinalists’ claim that a disparity between meaning and doctrine is 
necessary, is overblown.  
However, in the context of constitutional construction, the New 
Doctrinalists’ arguments have real traction. I showed that the 
Supreme Court is genuinely creative when it constructs 
constitutional meaning. This leads to a gap between the determinate 
constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine constructed by 
 
 255. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1317 (2006) (proposing the “permissible disparity 
thesis”).  
 256. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) 
(arguing that “the single most conspicuous” aspect of constitutional judicial review is the 
“judge-made tests of constitutional law that are not most fairly understood as themselves 
products of judicial constitutional interpretation”); see also Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 17, at 883 (“[I]n practice constitutional law generally 
has little to do with the text. Most of the time, in deciding a constitutional issue, the text plays 
only a nominal role.”).  
 257. FALLON, supra note 7, at 37–42.  
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the Court. The disparity between constitutional meaning and 
doctrine in the context of construction is necessary: in a situation 
where the Constitution’s meaning alone would not resolve a case, 
the Court must construct meaning that is substantively different 
from the Constitution’s meaning.  
E. Preliminary Note on the Scope of Originalist Precedent258 
Most originalist scholars agree that federal court judgments are 
binding on all three branches of the federal government259 (in 
addition to state actors).260 There is a vigorous originalist debate over 
whether federal judicial power also makes federal court opinions 
explaining judgments binding on the legislative and executive 
branches.261 At this point in my research, however, I have not 
determined whether my conception of originalist precedent includes 
only case judgments or whether it also includes explanatory 
opinions.262  
 
 258. I also do not address the extent to which Congress may revise constitutional 
precedent. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 804 (arguing that Congress does 
have that power).  
 259. See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretative Supremacy, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1539, 1561 (2005) (stating that “the majority of scholars support judicial 
supremacy”).  
 260. The notable exception is Michael Stokes Paulsen, who has powerfully argued that 
each branch of the federal government has independent interpretative authority. Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and 
Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993).  
 261. See John Harrison, Judicial Interpretative Finality and the Constitutional Text, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 33, 37 (2006) (finding that federal court judgments are binding, but not 
opinions); Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981-89 (1987) 
(arguing that federal court interpretations were not binding on the executive branch); Prakash 
&  Yoo,  supra note 259 at 1561–62 (arguing that only federal court judgments are binding 
precedent); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (defending the supremacy of judicial 
opinions on nonoriginalist grounds); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law 
and as Explanations for Judgment, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44 (1993) (arguing, based on 
nonoriginalist considerations, that only federal court judgments are binding).  
 262. See Solum, supra note 5, at 186–89 (distinguishing between realist and formalist 
views of stare decisis).  
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VII. THE INTERPRETATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES ARE 
MORE NORMATIVELY ATTRACTIVE THAN ALTERNATIVE 
CONCEPTIONS OF ORIGINALIST PRECEDENT 
A. Introduction 
All else being equal, a more normatively attractive originalism is 
preferable to a less attractive conception of originalism. For this 
reason, the most prominent originalists have offered originalist 
theories of interpretation that are, from the perspective of those 
committed to their respective philosophical traditions, normatively 
attractive. Randy Barnett provides an example of this because he 
argues that his originalism, with its libertarian reading of the 
Constitution’s original meaning and its presumption of liberty, leads 
to the greatest protection of natural rights.263 Similarly, the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches increase originalism’s 
normative attractiveness and are preferable to other conceptions of 
originalist precedent.  
B. The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches to Originalist 
Precedent are more Normatively Attractive than other Conceptions 
As I noted above, broadly speaking there are three plausible 
conceptions on the role of originalist precedent: (1) “get rid of it 
all”; (2) the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches; and (3) 
“common law constitutionalism.” The “get rid of it all”264 
conception is unattractive for a number of reasons.265 First, it 
diverges significantly from current practice: it fails to fit our legal 
practice.266 In law, fit is itself a powerful normative criterion.267 This 
conception’s failure to fit therefore strongly counts against it. 
 
 263. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 109; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 110–59 
(grounding originalism in popular sovereignty); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 
802–05) (arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that 
arise from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); Strang, supra note 25, at 983–97 
(2005) (using the Aristotelian tradition’s concept of human flourishing to justify originalism). 
Lawrence Solum has also argued that a version of originalism, what he calls Semantic 
Originalism, is compatible with most normative justifications for originalism. See Solum, supra 
note 11, at 128–34. 
 264.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 265. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 848–49 (arguing against the “get rid of 
it all” conception).  
 266. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 883–84 (noting that precedent and constitutional 
doctrine make up a significant portion of argument in constitutional cases).  
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Second, under the “get rid of it all” conception, originalist 
precedent does not serve the epistemic and constructive roles I 
outlined above when describing the Interpretative and Constructive 
Approaches toward originalist precedent.268 The “get rid of it all” 
conception, therefore, cannot claim the benefits that come with the 
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches. It cannot, for instance, 
take advantage of the efficiency that derives from the presumption 
that originalist precedent controls later cases.  
Third, there is harm to Rule of Law values caused by the “get rid 
of it all” conception. Many critics of originalism have argued that 
adoption of the “get rid of it all” conception would lead to legal 
instability as the law has an increased chance of change and in fact 
does change more frequently, both of which undermine stability in 
and reliance on the law.269 While I think that these criticisms are 
overstated,270 often as a way of trying generally to discredit 
originalism,271 it is true that the “get rid of it all” conception will 
protect Rule of Law values less well than the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches.  
For instance, the presumption of correctness under the 
Interpretative Approach makes it less likely that originalist precedent 
will be challenged and, consequently, less likely to be overruled (or 
modified in some other way, such as narrowed). The “get rid of it 
all” conception, by comparison, without the presumption, invites 
litigants and judges to reevaluate both a precedent’s articulation of 
the Constitution’s original meaning and its application. I argued 
above that both of these operations frequently place heavy burdens 
on human judgment and that, therefore, reasonable judges (and 
litigants) could and would plausibly come to different conclusions. 
 
 267. See Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for “Abuse” of an Easement: 
Moving Toward Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
933, 947–50 (2008) (explaining why fit is a powerful normative argument in law).  
 268. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 848–49. 
 269. See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1173, 1177–80 (2006) (listing the Rule of Law values served by stare decisis for the purpose 
of criticizing originalism); Strauss, supra note 17, at 925–28 (arguing that common law 
constitutionalism constrains judges more than originalism).  
 270. See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 956–57 (arguing that the Rule of Law criticism of 
originalism is weak).  
 271. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1232 (arguing that originalism’s critics, who use stare 
decisis to condemn originalism, do so to protect cases whose substantive results the critics 
prefer).  
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The pragmatic result is a higher likelihood of change in the law and 
harm to Rule of Law values.  
To make the costs of the “get rid of it all” conception more 
concrete, it is helpful to hypothesize how it would adversely impact a 
federal appellate court judge’s job. Imagine an originalist federal 
appellate court judge presiding over a case in which the judge must 
decide a question on the Constitution’s meaning. To avoid issues of 
vertical stare decisis,272 assume further that the question is not one 
that the Supreme Court’s precedent answers.273 There is, however, 
applicable originalist circuit court precedent.274  
Appellate court judges—and all federal judges, to a greater or 
lesser extent—are under tremendous pressure to efficiently 
adjudicate their crushing case load.275 The “get rid of it all” 
conception would make federal appellate judges’ jobs unmanageable. 
Judges and litigants would have to reevaluate every possible 
constitutional issue, regardless of how settled the issue.276 Daniel 
Farber explained how this would play out in the context of the First 
Amendment: 
It is simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs all of the 
time. Imagine if, in every First Amendment case, the lawyers had to 
reargue basic questions such as whether the First Amendment 
applies to the states or whether it covers nonpolitical speech (both 
of which have been debated by scholars). Every brief would have to 
be a treatise, arguing every point of First Amendment doctrine 
from scratch. Moreover, different judges could adopt completely 
different First Amendment theories, so a lawyer in a case before the 
Supreme Court might have to write nine different briefs based on 
inconsistent theories of the Constitution. Similarly, dialogue 
between the Justices themselves would be stymied because they 
 
 272. Vertical stare decisis is the bindingness of precedent by a higher court on a lower 
court.  
 273. A possible example of this is the legal question of whether the Second Amendment 
protected an individual right to keep and bear arms prior to the Supreme Court’s District of 
Columbia v. Heller decision.  
 274. Continuing with the Second Amendment example, prior to Heller, a number of 
circuits had ruled on the Second Amendment’s meaning vis-à-vis an individual right.  
 275. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FED. JUDICIAL CASELOAD: MAR. 31, 2009 
(2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/ 
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/front/IndicatorsMar09.pdf. 
 276. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 892 (explaining the “common-sense notion that one 
reason for following precedent is that it is simply too time consuming and difficult to 
reexamine everything from the ground up”).  
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would be operating within different conceptual frameworks. Unless 
most issues can be regarded as settled most of the time, coherent 
discussion is simply impossible. Surely “it would overtax the Court 
and the country alike to insist . . . that everything always must be 
up for grabs at once.”277 
In each case that raises a constitutional issue, the judge would be 
obliged to take up the often time-consuming task of first, uncovering 
the Constitution’s applicable original meaning and second, engaging 
in that often just-as-difficult task of applying the original meaning to 
the questions presented in the case. Judges simply do not have the 
time to do this.  
More fundamentally though, as I argued above, the correct 
application of the Constitution’s original meaning is one that we 
may expect, in many cases—and despite diligent, good faith effort—
will coexist with reasonable disagreement. Consequently, the “get 
rid of it all” conception of originalist precedent would result in a 
significant amount of inconsistent precedent.  
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches, by contrast, 
avoid these costs while preserving originalism as a viable theory of 
interpretation. The originalist judge following the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent will give 
precedent significant respect, which accords with our legal practice. 
The judge’s—and litigants’—work will therefore be more efficient 
because they need not revisit all possible questions of constitutional 
meaning and application. The Interpretative and Constructive 
Approaches’ significant respect for originalist precedent protects the 
Rule of Law values stare decisis serves.  
The “common law constitutionalism” conception avoids the 
costs of the “get rid of it all” conception, but it does so at the 
expense of originalism itself. The “common law constitutionalism” 
conception fully embraces stare decisis and the Rule of Law values it 
advances. Binding legal norms, embodied in the Supreme Court’s 
precedent, will remain authoritative, and hence the interests of 
reliance built up around those norms are protected. Proponents of 
this position also argue that it increases stability of the law,278 and 
achieves greater fairness.279 Advocates of this position therefore avoid 
 
 277. Farber, supra note 269, at 1177–78 (citations omitted).  
 278. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 926–27 (arguing that, unlike precedent, originalism is 
relatively unconstraining on judges).  
 279. Healy, supra note 34, at 1214.  
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the pitfalls of the “get rid of it all” conception. This is a significant 
accomplishment.  
Unfortunately, it comes at an unacceptable cost, especially if, as I 
have shown, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches can 
preserve most of what makes the “common law constitutionalism” 
conception attractive.280 The cost of the “common law 
constitutionalism” conception is the near-total, and in many cases 
total, abandonment of originalism.281 According to the “common 
law constitutionalism” conception, originalist precedent is protected 
by a near-irrebuttable presumption. Thus, a precedent that, for 
instance, later research strongly suggests incorrectly articulated the 
original meaning, would remain viable. Over time, constitutional 
adjudication would ever more deviate from the Constitution’s 
original meaning, leaving it a relic, unimportant to legal questions 
which are settled on the basis of precedent.282  
This eventuality is tellingly parallel to our current legal practice 
where nearly all areas of constitutional law are significantly 
influenced by or, in many instances, dominated by precedent at odds 
with the Constitution’s original meaning.283 It is not controversial 
that our current practice is largely nonoriginalist.284 Only in the event 
of historical accident, such as that which occurred in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, does the Constitution’s original meaning play a 
significant role.  
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward 
originalist precedent offer a better option. They preserve much of 
our current practice including, most importantly, a robust doctrine 
of stare decisis. At the same time, they ensure that the Constitution’s 
original meaning remains meaningful. Originalist precedent has 
weight in later courts’ analyses only if it meets the requirements of 
 
 280. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 849–50 (explaining why the “common 
law constitutionalism conception” is less attractive than a middle-of-the-road approach like 
mine). 
 281. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 899, 906 (concluding that while common law 
constitutionalism cannot “[e]xplicitly” overrule the text, it can produce “creative” 
interpretations).  
 282. Id. at 883.  
 283. See id. at 884 (stating that legal change has been largely not text-based).  
 284. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of 
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. 
L. REV. 671, 674–75 (1995) (finding that, because of the “Supreme Court’s present style of 
constitutional discourse,” the Constitution has been rendered “very nearly unintelligible” to 
the People).  
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OGF—only so long as the presumption that protects it remains 
unrebutted. The precedent therefore remains open to challenge and 
the Constitution’s original meaning remains the governing body of 
norms in our legal practice. This means that originalism retains 
viability in a way that it does not under the “common law 
constitutionalism” conception.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have shown that originalism preserves a 
substantial role for originalist precedent using the Interpretative and 
Constructive Approaches. Precedent that meets the test of OGF—
that is an objectively good faith attempt to articulate and apply the 
Constitution’s original meaning—is originalist precedent. I have 
illustrated how judges would use originalist precedent in 
constitutional interpretation and construction. I have also shown 
that originalist precedent receives significant respect under the 
Interpretative Approach because it provides evidence of the 
Constitution’s original meaning by specifying that meaning in 
concrete cases, bringing to light implicit constitutional norms, and 
resolving perceived tensions in the original meaning. Further, 
originalist precedent receives significant respect under the 
Constructive Approach because it constructs constitutional law, 
again by specifying that meaning in concrete cases, bringing to light 
implicit constitutional norms, and resolving perceived tensions in the 
original meaning. It also exerts gravitational force on other areas of 
law. 
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches enable judges to 
meet their Article III obligation to give precedent significant respect, 
and do so in a more normatively attractive way than other 
conceptions of originalist precedent by avoiding the temptation to 
reject precedent altogether, which is incompatible with our legal 
tradition, and by avoiding the dangers of giving too strong a 
presumption to originalist precedent that has drifted too far from 
original constitutional meaning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
